ARTICLES
DEFAULT RULES, WEALTH DISTRIBUTION, AND
CORPORATE LAW REFORM: EMPLOYMENT
AT WILL VERSUS JOB SECURITY
DAVID MILLONt
INTRODUCTION

In recent years, a number of commentators have criticized corporate law's traditional commitment to shareholder primacy because of
the costs it imposes on nonshareholder corporate constituencies.
The phrase "shareholder primacy" refers to management's legal duty
to pursue shareholder wealth maximization without regard for competing considerations. Despite the jarring social effects of the hostile
takeover craze of the 1980s, shareholder primacy has weathered those
storms and has managed to retain its status as corporate law's foundational principle.' Adherence to this norm can result in decisions that
are harmful to various corporate constituencies, including workers,
lenders, suppliers, and others involved with the corporation. For
example, seeking to maintain or enhance corporate profits for shareholders may prompt management to lay off workers or close production facilities. Such decisions can cause disastrous consequences for
those who lose their jobs, as well as further harmful ripple effects
t Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. Ph.D. 1982, Cornell University; J.D. 1983, Harvard University. The author appreciates generous assistance and
advice from Bill Bratton, Art Goldsmith, Lyman Johnson, Karl Kaiser, Russell
Korobkin, Joe McCahery, Larry Mitchell, and Blake Morant, as well as financial support from the Frances Lewis Law Center, Washington and Lee University.
' See, e.g., Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48
(Del. 1994) (holding that, when a corporation undertakes a transaction that will cause
"a change in corporate control" or "a break-up of the corporate entity, the directors'
obligation is to seek the best value reasonably available to the stockholders"). Shareholder primacy retains its foundational status despite recent legislative developments
appearing to point in a new direction. See infra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
For a fuller discussion of recently enacted "directors' duty" statutes that authorize
directors to consider nonshareholder constituents in decisionmaking, see generally
David Millon, Redefining CorporateLaw, 24 IND. L. REV. 223 (1991).
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within the local community and beyond. Similarly, management may
engage in activities beneficial to shareholders that increase the default risk faced by the corporation's creditors.3 In these and other
ways, nonshareholder corporate constituencies are vulnerable to
actions taken by corporate managers for the benefit of shareholders.
Scholars who have expressed concern about the social costs of
shareholder primacy have been labeled "communitarians." Applied
to corporate law scholarship, the term seems to have originated as a
pejorative designation deployed by defenders of the shareholder
primacy status quo.4 In fact, among the critics of shareholder primacy, it is hard to find a core set of premises that are distinctively
communitarian. Little effort has been made to forge links to the rich
and extensive philosophical literature on communitarianism.5 Corporate law communitarians seem to be united primarily by their
critical posture.
The common thread in this diverse body of work has been the effort to replace traditional shareholder primacy with a new legal regime-one that is more responsive to the problem of nonshareholder
vulnerability to the social costs generated by corporate law's traditional commitment to shareholder wealth maximization.
Some
writers have characterized the corporation as a community of interrelated, interdependent constituencies, and then drawn various norma-

2

For a compelling discussion of the social costs of plant closings and other exer-

cises in "downsizing," see THE DOWNSIZING OFAMERIcA (New York Times ed., 1996).
3 See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716
F. Supp. 1504, 1506
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (involving allegations that corporate executives "drastically impaired
the value of [corporate] bonds.., by... misappropriating the[ir] value" to help
finance a leveraged buyout).
' See Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Shareholders,Nonshareholders and Corporate
Law: Communitarianism and Resource Allocation, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 393, 395 (1993)
(labeling critics of shareholder primacy "communitarians" because they favor a"public
law" conception of corporate law).
5 Ironically, the most thorough attempt to draw on the philosophical literature has
been the remarkable article by Professor Cox, who is a critic-though an unusually
thoughtful and sympathetic one-of the communitarian turn in corporate law scholarship. See Paul N. Cox, The Public, the Private and the Corporation,80 MARQ. L. REV. 391
(1997) (seeking to clarify the premises and implications of both contractarian and
communitarian theories).
6 For a general discussion, see David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate
Law:
Foundationsand Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1 (Lawrence E.
Mitchell ed., 1995) [hereinafter Millon, Communitarianism]. For a bibliography of
scholarship in a more or less communitarian mode, see David Millon, Communitarians,
Contractarians,and the Crisis in CorporateLaw, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1391-93
(1993) [hereinafter Millon, Crisis in CorporateLaw].
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tive conclusions from this descriptive claim.

7

Others have relied on

rhetoric and analytical tools of neoclassical economics as the basis for
concrete law reform proposals." What brands the latter writers
"communitarian" is their attention to issues that traditionally have
been excluded from corporate law discourse. Their wider conception
of the appropriate scope for corporate law reflects a view of the corporation as a community of interests embracing more than just
shareholders and managers. Although the movement as a whole

might be better termed "progressive"9 than "communitarian," the
latter term has gained currency and, if nothing else, is sufficiently
broad and amorphous to warrant continued usage.
The communitarian perspective stands in contrast to the contractual or contractarian model of the corporation. According to the
contractarian position, ' the corporation is nothing more than a
7 See, e.g., Millon, Crisis in Corporate Law, supra note 6; Lawrence E. Mitchell,
A
Theoreticaland PracticalFrameworkforEnforcing CorporateConstituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L.
REV. 579 (1992) [hereinafter Mitchell, Theoreticaland PracticalFramework];Lawrence E.
Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1990)
[hereinafter Mitchell, Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders]; Lawrence E. Mitchell,
Trust. Contract. Process., in PROGRESSIvE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 6, at 185
[hereinafter Mitchell, Trust. Contract.Process.];Lyman Johnson, Individualand Collective
Sovereignty in the CorporateEnterpris 92 COLUM. L. REv. 2215 (1992) (reviewing ROBERT

N. BELLAH ET AL., THE GOOD SOCIETY (1991), and FRANK H. EAsTERBROOK
R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991)).

& DANIEL

8 See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Game Theory and the Restoration of Honor to Corporate
Law's Duty of Loyalty, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 6, at 139; Morey W.
McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 STETSON L. REV. 121 (1991); Marleen A.
O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing CorporateLaw to Facilitate LaborManagement Cooperation,78 CORNELL L. REv. 899 (1993).
9 "Progressive" can imply a commitment to social progress (admittedly a contestable concept) or an interest in "new ideas, inventions, or opportunities." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1813 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1981). For a
collection of essays by self-identified progressive corporate law scholars revealing their
characteristic breadth in normative stance and in willingness to look to novel ideas for
guidance, see generally PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supranote 6.
'0 The most comprehensive statement of the contractarian position is
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 7. For a concise overview, see Henry N. Butler,
The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, GEO. MASON L. REv., Summer 1989, at 99. A
complete list of scholars influenced by contractarian theory would include most of the
more prominent scholars in the corporate law field. This is a measure of the extent to
which the contractarian perspective currently dominates academic corporate law
discourse. See William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in CorporationLaw, 50 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 1395, 1400 (1993) (asserting the contractarian model to be the
"dominant legal academic view"). Contractarianism has been significantly less influential among judges and legislators, but no less influential than communitarianism.
The contractarian phenomenon represents the manifestation in one field of the
pervasive general influence of neoclassical economics on legal scholarship during the
last 20 or so years. When thinking about law and economics in the field of corporate
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nexus of contracts among the various suppliers of inputs (capital,
labor, credit, materials, and the like) to the production process. The
parties to these various contracts define their respective rights and
duties either through ad hoc bargaining that is more or less transaction-specific, or through acceptance of standard-form provisions that
are typically taken "off the rack." Examples of the former include
collective bargaining agreements and bond indentures, while the
terms provided by state corporate law-the body of statutory and
judge-made doctrine that defines the rights of shareholdersexemplify the latter. Seen in this light, it makes no sense to speak of
shareholders as enjoying a legally mandated privilege in relation to
other corporate constituencies. If the rights and duties of the various
corporate constituencies are thought of as creations of contract, any
benefits or advantages that shareholders enjoy are products of consent by the various affected parties, as are any costs or disadvantages
that other constituencies must bear.
According to this view, if relationships among shareholders and
nonshareholders are defined by contract, nonshareholders can protect themselves ex ante from the social costs of shareholder wealth
maximization by bargaining and paying for provisions that provide
the desired safeguards. For example, workers can bargain for job
security, or bondholders can bargain for specific protective covenants
or more general fiduciary protections." If they have not done so, it is
because they do not believe that such contract terms are worth the
price. 2 Legal reforms aimed at improving the welfare of nonshare-

law, one inevitably thinks about contractarianism. Even recent applications of game
theory and network externality theory rest on a contractual conception of the corporation and of corporate law. See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, Opting In and Opting Out:
Bargainingfor Fiduciary Duties in Cooperative Ventures, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 291 (1992)
(applying game theory to contractual analysis of fiduciary-duty law in business associations); Michael Klausner, Corporations,CorporateLaw, and Networks of Contracts,81 VA. L.
REV. 757 (1995) (applying the network externality idea to corporate law's contractarian paradigm).
1 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization
Norm: A Reply to ProfessorGreen, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1443 (1993) ("Those
nonshareholder constituencies that enter voluntary relationships with the corporation
thus can protect themselves by adjusting the contract price to account for negative
externalities imposed upon them by the firm."); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic
Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of
CorporateFiduciaryDuties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 36-39 (1991) (stating that nonshareholder constituencies such as workers and bondholders can protect themselves by
means of contracts if they are willing to pay for the protection).
12 See Macey, supra note 11, at 36-39, 36 ("[T] he absence of contractual
protection
for nonshareholder constituencies may simply reflect the fact that such constituencies
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holders would amount to interference with private ordering and, in
the contractarian view, would be illegitimate for that reason.'3 The
contractarian vision of the corporation thus differs from the communitarian stance, both in its descriptive and in its normative aspects.
In this Article, I seek to further the communitarian project by
proposing a new law reform strategy. I draw on recent economic
research to advance two claims. In Part II, I discuss the relevance of
the endowment effect and status quo bias to the distribution of gains
from trade in employment contracting. Part III then draws on pathdependency theory to argue that the current prevalence of at-will
employment does not necessarily indicate its superiority to job security and, therefore, does not provide a basis for rejecting the change
in the law proposed here. Before turning to those matters, however, I
consider, in Part I, existing law reform proposals in a communitarian
vein. Although these proposals have taken quite different directions
and are subject to important shortcomings, I believe they share a
valuable foundational commitment. They exemplify an unwillingness
to accept the sufficiency of private ordering as a mechanism for nonshareholder protection from the costs of shareholder wealth maximization. In my view, limited wealth imposes significant constraints on
the ability of certain nonshareholder constituencies to obtain legitimate safeguards through the bargaining process. I therefore suggest
in Part II that altering existing contractual default rules may improve
the bargaining capability of nonshareholders. I should stress that this
Article is modest in ambition. Even leaving aside the important and
controversial political question of whether the law ought to be used
for redistributive purposes, there remains the prior question of
whether the strategy considered here might actually create any benefits. The question proves to be far more complicated than typically
has been assumed. The
exploration offered here is therefore tenta4
preliminary.'
and
tive
are unwilling to pay for such protection in the form of lower wages or lower interest
rates on debt.").
" See Bainbridge, supra note 11, at 1434 (arguing that, since "nonshareholder
constituencies can adequately protect their claims through the contracting and
political processes," legal reforms aimed at aiding nonshareholders are "both unnecessary and wholly undeserved"); DeBow & Lee, supra note 4, at 422-24 ("Whether
communitarian legal scholars like it or not, the corporate entity is a contractual entity.
Accordingly, corporate law reform cannot succeed if it violates the essentially 'private'
nature of the contractual relations at the corporate entity's core.... [Clommunitarian
advocates of nonshareholder constituency statutes run afoul of this rule.").
" As such, this Article elaborates on an earlier, even more preliminary exploration
in Millon, Communitarianism supra note 6, at 22-30.
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I. COMMUNITARIAN LAW REFORM PROPOSALS
Communitarian corporate law scholars, sympathetic to nonshareholder claims for protection from the costs of shareholder wealth
maximization, have developed two general strategies. This Part
briefly examines these strategies, concluding that they are subject to
important shortcomings. I then suggest a new strategy that respects
communitarian misgivings about the adequacy of private ordering
while addressing my concerns about existing proposals. My alternative relies more heavily on bargaining than existing proposals have,
but within a framework of altered contractual default rules. This
approach seeks to redress the problem of "bargaining capability," a
concept discussed in Part I.D.1 below. Whether this proposal might
actually improve bargaining outcomes is considered in Part II.
A. The MultifiduciaryModel
One law reform strategy, which has been variously termed the
"constituency, ',1 or "directors'
"stakeholder,"'5 "multifiduciary,
duty"'" model, would redefine the duties of the corporation's board of
directors to include regard for nonshareholder as well as shareholder
interests. 19 Some have drawn inspiration from the new directors' duty

,' See, e.g., Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of

Corporate Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1409, 1411 (1993) ("'[S]takeholder' and
'multi-fiduciary' theories of the firm have been advanced as ways of... empowering
senior managers and directors sometimes to subordinate shareholder interests to
those of employees, communities, or other groups affected by corporate activities.").
16 See id.
17

See, e.g., Mitchell, Theoretical and PracticalFramework, supra note 7, at 579-80

(discussing "a 'constituency statute,' which authorizes... corporate boards of directors to consider the interests of constituencies other than stockholders in making
corporate decisions" (footnotes omitted)).
'8 See, e.g., Millon, supra note 1, at 225 ("[D]irectors' duty statutes authorize
management to consider the interests of various nonshareholder constituencies.., in
making business decisions." (footnote omitted)).
'9 See, e.g., McDaniel, supra note 8, at 121-22 (arguing in favor of statutes that
permit directors to consider nonshareholder interests); Millon, supra note 1, at 225
(describing statutes that permit directors to consider nonshareholder interests); David
Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 203-04 (same); Mitchell, Theoretical and PracticalFramework, supra note 7, at 579-80 (same); Marleen A. O'Connor,
Restructuring the Corporation'sNexus of Contracts: Recognizing a FiduciaryDuty to Protect

Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1229-30 (1991) (same); Katherine Van Wezel
Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21

STETSON L. REV. 45, 45-47 (1991) (same); Steven M.H. Wallman, The ProperInterpretation of Corporate Constituency Statutes and Formulation of Director Duties, 21 STETSON L.

REV. 163, 165 (1991) (describing constituency statutes as imposing a fiduciary duty on
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statutes. 20 These statutes, which in various forms have been adopted
by nearly thirty states, 2' permit (or, in one case, require2) the board
to consider workers, creditors, suppliers, consumers, and local communities in making decisions about corporate policy and strategy.
Other advocates of a multifiduciary approach take a similar position
without grounding their analyses on these statutes.2 These scholars
would reconceptualize the board of directors as mediator among the
various interests of nonshareholders and shareholders, in place of the
standard conception of the board as agent for the shareholders.
By encouraging the board to consider nonshareholder interests
when those interests conflict with the interests of shareholders, the
multifiduciary model obviously would impose burdens on shareholders that do not exist under the current shareholder primacy regime.
The conceptual basis for this change is the idea of the corporation as
a community. The point is to propose an alternative to the contractarian notion of the corporation as, in effect, a marketplace that
serves as a venue for atomistic individuals seeking to further their own
interests through bargaining and exchange. The normative payoff of
the corporation-as-community model is the suggestion that the web of
directors to act in the corporation's best interests but "not requir[ing directors] to
consider shareholder interests or any other constituency's interests as dominant or
controlling").
20 See, e.g., Millon, supra note 1 (discussing directors' duty statutes and proposing
an interpretive strategy); Mitchell, Theoretical and PracticalFramework, supra note 7
(same).
21 These include Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. For citations, see
Millon, supra note 1, at 241 n.76. Delaware has not enacted one of these statutes.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756(d) (3) (West 1997) ("[A] director of a
corporation ... shall consider, in determining what he reasonably believes to be in the
best interests of the corporation .... the interests of the corporation's employees,
customers, creditors and suppliers .... ").
2' See, e.g., O'Connor, supra note 8, at 904 (noting that under the "neutral referee
model" of corporate governance, "[d]irectors would owe fiduciary obligations to
employees, including the duty to provide information and consult with them about
strategic decisions that affect job security and working conditions"); see also Millon,
supranote 19, at 203-04 ("Responding to widespread concerns about the harsh impact
of hostile takeovers... [in the 1980s], state legislatures, courts, and commentators
have focused on the notion of the corporation as aggregation, defined broadly to
include not just shareholders and management but also other participants in the
corporate enterprise."); Mitchell, FairnessRights of CorporateBondholders,supra note 7, at
1167 ("All but ignored by [views that corporations have few obligations to bondholders] is the powerful use of legal principles to express higher aspirations of community
and cooperation such as those underlying fiduciary duty.").
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ongoing relationships constituting productive activities involves significant elements of interdependence and cooperation that cannot be
captured fully by reference solely to a set of bilateral contracts. The
content of these relationships gives rise to obligations existing independently of bargaining.24
B. ProgressiveContractarianism

The second law reform strategy pursued by advocates of nonshareholder protection takes an approach different from the multifiduciary model. It focuses on lower-level workers among the corporation's various nonshareholder constituencies. Drawing on economic
analyses of firms' internal labor markets, these scholars would require
corporate management to honor implicit commitments to job security and deferred compensaon.25 According to this model, the employment relationship involves compensation that is lower than the
value of the worker's marginal product early in her career with the
firm, with an implicit promise to pay more than its value later in her
career.6 This pattern, which assumes job security and long-term
24As one scholar has noted:
The image of the corporation as the fee simple owner of its own property
is an image that has outlived its usefulness. A better paradigm would focus on
the industrial relations between and among the thousands of persons who
participate in the ongoing affairs of the business or who depend on its success.... The rights of these thousands of persons are only partly governed by
contract. The business constitutes a network of ongoing relationships. The
factory is a locus for this network.
Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 640-41
(1988). In two recent essays, Professors Bratton and Mitchell discuss the importance
of trust in production relationships. See Bratton, supra note 8; Mitchell, Trust. Contract.
Process., supra note 7. Although these authors do not deal directly with the multifiduciary model in these essays, their focus on noncontractual aspects of relationships
between contracting parties underscores the idea that there is more to production
than contract alone.
2 See O'Connor, supra note 19; O'Connor, supra note 8; Stone, supra note 19;
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Policing Employment Contracts Within the Nexus-of-Contracts
Firm, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 353 (1993).
See RONALD G.EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS 398402, 399 (6th ed. 1997) ("One feasible compensation-sequencing scheme would pay
workers less than their marginal product early in their careers and more than their
marginal product later on."); James N. Brown, Why Do Wages Increasewith Tenure? Onthe-Job Trainingand L fe-Cycle Wage Growth Observed Within Firms, 79 AM. ECON. REv. 971,
971 (1989) (arguing that the "'human capital"' model "explains the concave pattern of
life-cycle earnings and wages as reflecting a similar pattern in life-cycle productivity,
deriving from optimal investments that diminish gradually over the life cycle"); Robert
Hutchens, Delayed Payment Contracts and a Firm'sPropensity to Hire Older Workers, 4J. LAB.
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employment, encourages hard work to avoid discharge prior to payment of deferred compensation. It also encourages workers to make
upfront investments in firm-specific human capital that they would be
reluctant to make if discharge were a significant risk. The employer's
commitments typically are not stated expressly and therefore are not
27
enforceable under existing legal doctrine. Although reputational
considerations may counsel against doing so, managers seeking to
maximize corporate profits have a natural incentive to renege on
these promises of job security and deferred compensation by discharging workers who have been with the company for a number of
years. By making these commitments legally enforceable, corporate
law could strengthen the currently precarious position of workers.
Law reform proposals based on implicit labor contracts do not
rely on the creation of mandatory contract terms imposed by law
upon the parties. Rather, they seek enforcement of implicit promises
of job security grounded in a context of induced reliance.2 This
approach to corporate law reform resonates with the communitarian
regard for the costs of shareholder wealth maximization as they may
affect workers. However, rather than attempting to redefine existing
legal relationships, scholars relying on implicit labor contract theory
look to the actual bargain as the basis for worker protection, seeking
to identify the implicit understandings that rational employers and
workers build into the employment contract.30 Because its normative

ECON. 439, 440-41 (1986) ("[E]mployers and employees may enter into implicit
contracts whereby workers are underpaid at the beginning of the contract and overpaid at the end."); Edward P. Lazear, Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours
Restrictions, 71 AM. ECON. REv. 606, 606 (1981) ("[I]t is optimal to... pay workers less
than the value of marginal products... when they are young and more than the value
of marginal products when they are old."); James M. Malcomson, Work Incentives,
Hierarchy, and InternalLaborMarkets, 92J. POL. ECON. 486, 488 (1984) ("Wage rates rise
more with seniority and experience than productivity does.").
2 See Stone, supra note 25, at 371-73 (noting that, under current legal rules
in the
United States, managers have the power to breach implicit contracts).
2 See Note, Employer Opportunism and the Needfor a just Cause Standard, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 510, 523-25, 524 (1989) (noting that "opportunistic discharges will occur on a
regular basis... ifjob security provisions are costly to the firm").
2 See O'Connor, supra note 19, at 1203-07 (discussing various aspects of implicit
labor contracts); Stone, supra note 25, at 366 ("Workers' investments in firm-specific
capital and deferred compensation are made not on the basis of some explicit contractual arrangement, but rather take the form of an implicit contract.").
" See O'Connor, supra note 19, at 1239; Stone, supra note 25, at 366-69.
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foundation rests on bargain, this law reform strategy may be termed
"progressive contractarianism."3 '
C. Critique

1. The Multifiduciary Model
From the contractarian perspective, a board of directors empowered to rearrange contractually specified rights and duties interferes
with efficiency and freedom of contract, which in turn rest on secure
property rights. According to this view, the idea that a corporation's
duty to its bondholders or workers extends beyond express contractual commitments amounts to an uncompensated transfer of wealth
from the shareholders to the favored constituency. One might respond that the multifiduciary mandate (whether imposed legislatively
orjudicially) implies such a possibility in every shareholder's contract
with the corporation, such that shareholders tacitly consent to its
burden. This is the lesson ofJustice Story's Dartmouth College concurrence s2 and of subsequent reservations of the power to amend that are
included in every state corporation statute. 3 The contractarian response would emphasize not only the unfairness of changing the
terms of the deal to which current shareholders committed themselves, but also the uncertainty and consequent devaluation of property rights if the shareholders are subjected to the vagaries of the
multifiduciary conception of the board's role.
Even if one does not accept the premises on which the contractarian critique of the multifiduciary model rests, the model is still vulnerable to questioning on other grounds.3 4 A mandate to consider

31 See Millon, Communitarianism, supra note 6, at 16-19, 16 (noting
that "[t]he
common thread that runs through [progressive contractarians'] work is the argument
that agreements-whether implicit or hypothetical-in actual bargaining relationships
should provide the basis for legal intervention on behalf of aggrieved nonsharehold-

ers").
32 SeeTrustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 250, 337, 4 Wheat. 518,
712 (1819) (Story, J., concurring) ("[A]ny act of a legislature which takes away any
powers or franchises vested by its charter in a private corporation, or its corporate
officers, or which restrains or controls the legitimate exercise of them.., is a violation
of the obligations of that charter. If the legislature mean to claim such an authority, it
must be reserved in the grant.").
s3See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 1.02 (1984) (reserving to state legislature the
power to amend the act).
s4For elaboration of these points, see Millon, Communitarianism, supra note 6, at
13-16.

1998]

DEFAULT RULES AND WEALTHDISTRJBUTION

nonshareholder as well as shareholder interests offers no guidance
about how management is supposed to make tradeoff determinations
in cases of conflict. Furthermore, assigning to management responsibility for the well-being of various nonshareholder constituencies
replicates-and probably exacerbates-the accountability or agency
cost difficulties already borne by shareholders. Finally, some might
prefer a structure of governance that develops new market or political
processes through which nonshareholders might better protect their
own interests rather than having to rely on the paternalism of corporate management.
2. Progressive Contractarianism
The freedom-of-contract critique leveled against the multifiduciary strategy misses the mark when applied to progressive contractarianism. Progressive contractarians aim merely to remedy the opportunistic breaches of undertakings freely entered into by employers.
This approach can, however, be questioned on other grounds.36 For
one thing, the economists' "life-cycle earnings" model describes in a
general way the relationship among a worker's actual wage, her opportunity wage, and the value of her marginal product, but the model
is not intended to provide an actual measure for the discounted
present value of an employer's commitment to job security in a particular case.37 Even if one accepts the theoretical soundness of implicit labor contract theory, it is largely indeterminate as a valuation
measure in actual cases.
More fundamentally, the progressive contractarian argument accords normative significance to actual bargaining relationships. Like
the express terms of the contract, the unstated, implicit undertakings
are the products of actual bargaining. As such, market forces and
workers' limited bargaining capabilities sharply restrict the range of
possibilities. Although it may be in management's interest to induce
workers to put forth high effort and to make firm-specific investments

Even proposals that attempt to put some flesh on the bare bones of the statutory
structure rely on vague conceptions like "long-term strategies" and "legitimate nonshareholder expectations." See Millon, supra note 1, at 265-69 (discussing directors'
duty statutes and offering interpretive principles).
For a critique of progressive contractarianism, see Millon, Communitatianism,
supra note 6, at 19-22.
37 For example, Stone provides a graph that clearly expresses the relationship
among these variables, but the graph does not purport to assign actual values to them.
See Stone, supra note 25, at 365.
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in human capital, management can still preclude legal enforcement
of worker expectations by expressly disclaiming them.3 Workers will
be able to overcome such disclaimers only if they can afford the costs
of legal protection. If they cannot afford to pay for job security
(presumably in the form of a lower wage), they will be unable to
obtain it. The progressive contractarian position is rhetorically forceful because it relies on bargaining as the basis for worker protection.
It is, however, conceptually constricted by the bargaining limitations
that workers inevitably confront, which impose a ceiling on the gains
that workers can hope realistically to realize.3 9
See William H. Simon, What Difference DoesIt Make Whether CorporateManagersHave

PublicResponsibilities?,50 WASH. & LEEL. REv. 1697, 1701 (1993) ("[U]nder a reliance
approach, managers can satisfy their responsibilities simply by discouraging reliance.
For example, in the employment context, consistent disclaimers of any intention to
provide job and compensation security should do the trick.").
39A further criticism of communitarian law reform proposals-both in their
multifiduciary and progressive contractarian manifestations-might focus on the role
of the state in their implementation and enforcement. See Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Community and Statism: A Conservative ContractarianCritique of Progressive CorporateLaw
Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 856, 885-90 (1997) (reviewing PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 6) (criticizing communitarians' asserted reliance on state

power in their models). Professor Bainbridge favors a minimalist state, see id. at 89091, in contrast to what he calls the "nanny state," id. at 891. In this regard, he asserts
that the state's role should be "limited to that of a facilitator of private gain-seeking
through provision of default rules." Id. at 890.
One problem with Bainbridge's normative vision is its incoherence. His commitment to markets turns out to be qualified. In addition to facilitation of "private gainseeking," Bainbridge also believes that the state should promote "mediating institutions," id. at 892, by which he means "churches, schools, and social clubs," id. at 884.
Such institutions are important, he says, for the inculcation of values like "virtue, trust,
responsibility, and the like." Id. Like most advocates for social agendas, Bainbridge
thus ends up endorsing an activist role for the state in the implementation of a substantive vision of a good society. He also has little to say about how the state should
promote the institutions he favors, but the thrust of his remarks seems to be that
private exchange alone will not suffice. See id. at 895 (suggesting that the state should
create "a public square where the virtuous can act honorably").
Bainbridge's fundamental quarrel is with the notion that law might be used in
efforts to ameliorate social problems. He cites a deep distrust of political reform
(because of sinful human nature), see id. at 886-87 & n.150, but otherwise has nothing
to say about why the status quo-this status quo, including existing distributions of
wealth and power-deserves to be perpetuated. If Bainbridge's form of argument had
been accepted a thousand years ago, some of the institutions that he embracesespecially market-based capitalism-never would have emerged.
For a critical, but more thoughtful, exploration of the political theoretical implications of corporate law communitarianism, and the question of the role of the state in
particular, see Cox, supra note 5, at 505-13. For example, Cox notes that liberation of
managers from the state-imposed shareholder primacy norm might be construed as
relaxation of a restrictive legal rule and therefore could be thought of as antistatist.
See id. at 520-22, 521 (stating that "[i]f managers are to have full discretion, they

DEFAULTRULES AND WEALTHDISTRIBUTION
D. Law Reform andDefault Rules
Even if one accepts that the social costs of shareholder wealth
maximization should be reduced through law reform, the criticisms
of both the multifiduciary and progressive contractarian approaches
to corporate law reform, outlined above, suggest the need for new law
reform strategies. In what follows, I take my cue initially from the
concern that the multifiduciary model of the board's duties is simply
too vague and indeterminate a basis on which to ground prospects for
meaningful law reform. This proposition seems particularly forceful
in comparison with corporate law's traditional reliance on express
contractual terms for the definition of management's responsibilities
to nonshareholders. Contract also has the virtue of having a basis in
mutual consent. However, reliance on contract is subject to the
limitations on bargaining outcomes that are inherent in the existing
distribution of wealth. Accordingly, this subpart proposes a law reform strategy that avoids or mitigates each of these shortcomings.
Whether the proposal can properly be termed "communitarian"
will be open to question. However, its underlying impulse is twofold:
a concern for the vulnerability of nonshareholders to the costs of
shareholder wealth maximization, and a willingness to consider appropriate changes in the law. In this respect, the proposal resonates
with the work of corporate law communitarians. Before turning to
the proposal itself, this subpart begins by exploring the fundamental
deficiency with the mainstream contractarian approach to corporate
law.
1. Bargaining Capability
Contractarians have argued that nonshareholders have the technological capability to protect themselves from the costs of shareholder wealth maximization through bargaining and contract. If
workers are worried about plant closings, they can bargain and pay
for job security. Bondholders can seek protective covenants to cover
risks not dealt with in standard bond indentures. 4' For at least some
nonshareholders, however, the feasibility assertion is debatable.
Nonshareholders may lack access to information about future risks,

[would be] free to contract with providers of capital to abstain from commitment to
Communitarian norms").
40See, e.g., sources cited supra note 11.
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and the costs of obtaining such information and then negotiating and
drafting appropriate contract terms may exceed the benefits.
In addition, even if contractual self-protection is technologically
feasible, obtaining protection depends on more than technological
feasibility. The existing distribution of wealth imposes significant
limitations on bargaining outcomes. Assume, for example, that a
worker can obtain employment at a particular wage. In addition to
the wage specification, the employment contract will also include a
package of terms and conditions governing the employment relationship. These terms may be written or may be unwritten but understood by the parties as consistent with the established course of
dealing in that particular labor market. Alternatively, they may be
supplied by law in the form of default rules that apply in the absence
of agreement, regardless of whether anyone actually has given them
any thought. The standard package typically includes a term providing that employment is on an at-will basis. According to traditional
common law doctrine, this means that the employer has the right to
discharge a worker for any or no reason.4' If, instead, the worker
prefers a term providing for security against discharge, the worker
would have to persuade the employer to agree to that term and the
worker would have to pay for that benefit. Payment would be necessary because the term imposes a cost on the employer that it otherwise would not have to bear. Presumably the worker would pay for
job security by accepting a lower wage. 2
The possibility of self-protection through contract thus turns on
whether workers can afford to pay for it. Virtually everyone has limited resources and must make choices subject to constraints, such as
the need for basic necessities of food, shelter, and clothing. Only
after these basic needs are satisfied can the possibility of purchasing
other goods be entertained. Trading cash income for protection
41 Most states

now recognize a "public policy" exception to the employer's right to

discharge. See MARK A RoTSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAw 542-53 (1994) ("Every

state except Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, New York, and Rhode Island,
recognizes the public policy exception to the employment at will rule in one form or
another."); id. at 543 ("Many... public policy cases are referred to as 'retaliatory
discharge' cases, because the discharge is in retaliation for actions of an employee
pursuant to public policy[, categorized as] (1) refusing to perform unlawful acts, (2)
reporting illegal activity (whistieblowing), (3) exercising rights under state law, and
(4) performing a civic duty."). Montana has enacted a wrongful-discharge statute
requiring employers to show just cause for discharge. See MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 39-2-901 to -915 (1997).
42 An alternative would be for the worker
to accept revisions of some other terms
in the contract that would reduce the employer's cost.
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against discharge is especially difficult for those who are relatively
poor because they have less discretion with respect to spending. As a
practical matter, such workers might value job security highly, but
might be unable to pay for it without having to make unacceptable
sacrifices in other areas of their lives. In this sense, they lack the
resources and, therefore, the capability to bargain and pay for protection. Self-protection might be technologically feasible but practically
impossible.4
Although it is often said that workers are at a bargaining disadvantage in relation to employers, I do not refer to "unequal bargaining power" as a justification for the law reform proposal advanced
here. As a basis for criticism of bargaining outcomes, the phrase
possesses a variety of meanings. Differences in bargaining skill can
affect the division of gains from trade. The concept of unequal bargaining power may also mean that outcomes are a function of one
party's greater dependency on the other, such that the dependent
party lacks bargaining leverage." Yet another use of the term is to
refer to the ability of contracting parties to impose costs on each
other as a mechanism for obtaining concessions.4 Differences in
levels of risk aversion and fear of the consequences of failure to reach
46
an agreement may also place one party at a bargaining disadvantage.
While some or all of these notions of unequal bargaining power
may be relevant to employment contracting, my emphasis is on a
more fundamental feature of contemporary American life. In a social
system that relies on bargaining and contracts, disparities in wealth
and other advantages limit the ability of many people to obtain basic
goods. As the gap between the rich and the poor grows wider, a
model of social relations that relies excessively on private ordering to
ensure individual well-being becomes increasingly difficult to justify.
At some level, this concern about limited bargaining capability seems
to unite the various communitarian objections to the corporate law
contractarians' normative position.

Obviously this argument works better for some nonshareholder constituencies,
such as lower-level workers, than for others, such as large institutional bondholders.
41 SeeSAMUEL B. BACHARACH & EDIWARDJ. LAWLER, BARGAINING 79 (1981).
4 See BRUCE E. KAUFMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR MARKETS 560-62 (4th ed.
1994) (discussing bargaining power in the context of collective bargaining).
46 See Melvin W. Reder, On Labor's BargainingDisadvantage, in LABOR ECONOMICS
AND INDUSTRIAL REL2ATIONS 237, 241-43 (Clark Kerr & Paul D. Staudohar eds., 1994).
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2. A Default-Rule Approach
Concerns about limited bargaining capability do not necessarily
imply a wholesale rejection of private ordering. The law reform
approach considered in this Article would accept the priority of bargain as the basis for corporate relationships. In this respect, the
proposal is contractarian. However, it would seek to improve the
outcomes that nonshareholders can attain under current legal doctrine and, in the light of existing bargaining constraints, by changing
existing contractual default rules that appear to privilege shareholders over nonshareholders. Part II of this Article considers whether
such changes actually might be beneficial. Before turning to that
question, however, it is necessary to discuss briefly default rules more
generally.
As the various participants in corporate activities define the terms
of their relationships with one another, they often will reach express
agreements on various matters. Contractual silence can also serve
this function because, in the absence of express agreement, an array
of default rules will supply contract terms. Some of these rules are
part of corporate law, such as the rule that provides for limited liability unless protection is waived.47 Others are not found in corporation
statutes. For example, the common law at-will doctrine governs employment relations in the absence of express agreement to the contrary.48 Similarly, courts have held that corporate management enjoys
the presumption of freedom to shut down a plant 9 or incur additional debt5 ° despite harmful effects on local communities or existing
creditors.

47 See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 6.22(b) (1984) ("Unless otherwise
provided in
the articles of incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable for
the acts or debts of the corporation .... ").

48 ROTHSTEIN ET AL.., supra note 41, at 78 (stating that
the presumptively at-will
nature of employment contracts may be altered by agreeing that employment will only
be terminated for "cause"); see also id. at 9-11 (discussing the common-law development of the employment-at-will doctrine).
48 See Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556, 561 (Mich. CL App.
1993) (stating that General Motors was not estopped from closing its plant even when
it had accepted tax abatement from the city and had given hopeful proclamations of
its long-term commitment, because it did not promise explicitly to remain open).
See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1508
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("There being no express covenant between the parties that would
restrict the incurrence of new debt, and no perceived direction to that end from
covenants that are express, this Court will not imply a covenant to prevent the recent
[leveraged buy-out] . .. ").
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The specification of rights and dudes included in a default rule is
not immutable because, by definition, the parties are free to contract
around the rule. In this respect, default rules differ from mandatory
ones. Default rules typically do, however, embody a bias: Shareholders enjoy limited liability, unless otherwise agreed, and employers can
discharge workers at will, unless otherwise agreed. Default rules such
as these presumptively favor one party over its counterpart, because
they place the burden on the disfavored party to bargain out of the
default term if that term is undesirable. This notion of presumption
or burden gives rise to what I refer to as "default-rule bias." In reality,
most default rules affecting the relationship of nonshareholders to
the corporation are biased in favor of shareholders and their agent
corporate management.5'
These biases are not themselves the product of contract. A default term cannot become part of a contract unless the parties enter
into a contractual relationship with each other. However, the content
of a default rule-including its bias-is the product of prior state
action. A statute or a judicial decision establishes the default rule
independent of private bargaining. In this sense, default rules and
their biases are precontractual. 52
The remainder of this Article will consider whether nonshareholders might gain from reversing current default rules such that the
new rules will be biased in favor of nonshareholders against shareholders. The intuition I wish to pursue is the possibility that the
beneficiaries of default rules receive an advantage in relation to the
parties with whom they contract. This is not a novel approach to law
reform. For example, consumer warranties that apply unless expressly disclaimed53 are assumed to make buyers better off than they
would be if the default rule were caveat emptor. Another example is
the landlord's implied warranty of habitability, which, under the
Second Restatement of Property, is waivable absent unconscionability
or public-policy concerns. 4
It is not at all obvious, however, that default rules benefit the parties whom they appear to favor, or that choices between default rules
have any effect on bargaining outcomes. It is at least possible that
"ISee supranotes 47-50.
2 See Millon, Communitaiianism, supra note 6, at 25 ("[T]he bias of [a default
rule] ... is not a product of agreement. A legal rule has already determined that
question, and it has done so precontractually.").
5s See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69, 90 (N.J. 1960).

See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 5.6 (1977).

992

UNIVERSI7Y OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVMW

[Vol. 146: 975

contract terms are fully priced by the parties such that the choice
between alternative terms (for example, limited liability versus personal liability or at-will versus job security) does not affect the parties'
wealth. If so, assuming full information and leaving aside possible
transaction costs, changing default rules to their opposites should
make no distributive or allocative difference. As discussed below, this
is the orthodox law-and-economics view. 55 Part II questions the validity of that view.
3. The At-Will Default Rule
In exploring a default-rule approach to law reform, this Article
focuses on a particular example, the employment-at-will default rule.
Despite recent inroads, the prevailing employment practice in this
country continues to be employment at will. 56 That is, nonunionized

workers can be discharged by their employers at any time and for
virtually any reason.5 7 For the employer to enjoy this freedom, an
employment contract need not include an express provision so providing. As a default rule, the at-will contract term will be supplied by
the law in the absence of an agreement to the contrary.58
An alternative to the at-will contract term would be a default rule
guaranteeing job security. Express promises of job security are generally phrased in terms of a requirement that the employer discharge
the worker only for 'just cause."5 9 This generally implies security of
tenure except in cases of worker malfeasance or nonfeasance.6 In
addition, a just-cause job-security term typically allows discharge in
the event of genuine economic

necessity.

Although a job-security

SSSee infra text accompanying note 72.
56 See Clyde W. Summers, Worker Dislocation: Who Bears the Burden?
A Comparative
Study of Social Values in Five Countries, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1033, 1035-36 (1995)
("All employment is at will unless a specific contractual provision provides to the
contrary.").
57 In recent years, state courts have created a public-policy
exception to the at-will
doctrine, such as discharge for refusal to perform unlawful acts or for reporting
unlawful activities. See supra note 41. Unionized workers may enjoy job-security

protections, but only a tiny fraction of the workforce in this country is unionized. The
percentage of the workforce that is unionized seems to decline each time the statistics
are updated. As of 1996, union members accounted for 14.5% of wage and salary
employment, down from 14.9% in 1995. See Union Members in 1996, NEws (Bureau of

Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Washington, D.C.),Jan. 31, 1997, at 1.
See ROTHSTEIN ETAL, supra note 41, at 78.

For a discussion ofjust-cause limitations, see id. at 540-42.
'oSee id. at 541.
59

61

See id.
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default rule could be defined in various ways, it most conveniently
might be taken to incorporate current understandings of these justcause limitations. Accordingly, if job security rather than employment at will were the default rule, a worker would enjoy these protections absent an actual agreement to the contrary.62
I propose to change the current employment-at-will default rule
to ajob-security default rule. In keeping with the bargaining capability idea previously discussed,63 I would limit that change to hourlywage as opposed to salaried employees. The case for improving the
latter group's bargaining outcomes is, generally speaking, not as
strong as it is for less wealthy members of the workforce.
In advancing this proposal, my objective is not for job security
necessarily to replace employment at will as the usual contracting
practice.6 Rather, in accordance with the ameliorative agenda laid
612Other

default rules could be modified in a similar manner.

For example,

current default rules could be replaced by presumptions specifying unlimited shareholder liability or imposing on management an obligation of good faith and fair
dealing toward creditors.
63See supra PartI.D.1.
If one were serious about ensuringjob security on a widespread basis, one could
advocate a mandatory rule requiring job security in all employment contracts.
Whether workers would necessarily be better off depends on how much they would
have to pay for this benefit in the form of lower wages. See infra note 90. In light of
the possibility that a mandatory job-security term could be harmful to workers, it
would seem that such a change in the law might be a bad idea. However, even if a
mandatory job-security term would make workers worse off, one could still reject
workers' valuation ofjob security. A societal judgment that workers are better off with
job security, despite the reduction in wages, could displace individualjudgments. Lawmakers sometimes engage in paternalistic mandates of this sort when they are convinced that the choice in question is a bad one, such as when they prohibit the consumption of various substances. Such societal judgments may be based on concerns
about the external effects of the behavior in question, or they may reflect doubts
about the voluntariness of certain choices. Alternatively, some choices may simply be
deemed too self-destructive or degrading to the individual to be worthy of respect. See
DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAvEs 237 (1989) ("We value choice, ... but some options are
so self-destructive that we won't allow people to choose them, even if they act voluntarily."). The illegality of a contract selling oneself into slavery is an obvious example.
One might say that, from an objective standpoint, such choices are substantively
irrational.
The choice we are considering here-a preference for at-will employment and a
higher wage-does not seem to warrant societal prohibition due to substantive irrationality or doubts about voluntariness. For many workers, a preference for current
income overjob security may be quite rational. Some older workers, for example, may
no longer be as concerned about discharge as their younger colleagues because they
are nearing retirement age and have the financial capability to retire sooner if they
must. For these workers, what amounts to an employer-provided insurance policy
(priced with younger workers in mind) would not be worth the cost. Even younger
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out above, my focus is on the question of whether workers might end
up wealthier under a new default rule. Because the job-security term
would be a default rule rather than a mandatory one, workers and
employers would be free to contract for an at-will provision instead. If
workers continue to work on an at-will basis for the most part, but
earn higher wages, I would count that as success. Conversely, if, as a
result of changing the default rule, job security were to replace at-will
employment, but the value to workers ofjob security plus wages (and
other noncash benefits) was lower than the value of at-will employment combined with current compensation packages, workers would
be worse off and the contemplated legal change would be a mistake.65
Replacing the at-will default rule with a job-security default rule
may appear questionable for various reasons. At the very least, ajobsecurity regime appears to run counter to current economic developments in this country that are assumed to be driven by irresistible
global competitive forces.66 In response, I reiterate that I am considering job security only as a default rule. Workers and employers for
workers may differ among one other in their assessments of the risk of discharge. It
will often be hard to say that such assessments should be disrespected. And, even
where assessments of risks are similar, workers will differ in their attitudes toward risk.
A young worker with marketable skills who lacks family responsibilities or roots in a
community may well be willing to accept the risk of discharge in exchange for higher
cash compensation. Other workers for whom stability is more important will view the
matter differently.
One might still suggest that a mandatory job-security term is necessary if one is
concerned that some workers, by preferring at-will status and higher pay, impose costs
on others who have not agreed to bear them. Perhaps, the argument might go,
workers should not be allowed to make this choice when its consequences will fall on
family members who are dependent on their employment. Other social costs would
include increased burdens on welfare agencies and creditors. Even if this argument
could apply to some workers, it may not be strong enough to justify an across-theboard job-security mandate. For many workers, young and single, or older and financially secure, a preference for at-will status and higher pay does not create negative
externalities. Given uncertainty about the magnitude of the social costs associated
with at-will employment, a law reformer probably should hesitate to impose a mandatory job-security term for this reason alone. Furthermore, a mandatory job-security
term could itself generate significant social costs, such as higher labor costs and lower
levels of employment, that would otherwise not be present and that would outweigh
any benefits. Such concerns are speculative, but, when added to the uncertainty about
the social costs of at-will employment, the result may well be a heightened reluctance
to require job security.
This would happen if transaction costs were greater than the wage differential.
Professor Gordon describes a "New Economic Order" characterized by enhanced flexibility in firms' ability to make workforce adjustments in response to
market pressures and opportunities, as well as by liberalization in international trade
and capital markets. SeeJeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic
Order,97 COLUM. L. REV. 1519 (1997).
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whom job security is undesirable would remain free to opt out of the
default and return to an at-will contract term. Barring excessive
transaction costs, one would expect this to occur if both parties would
be better off by doing so. If at-will employment is truly more efficient
than job security, changing the default rule to job security would not
necessarily result in widespread adoption of a new contract term.
Seen in this light, my proposal may seem more modest than it initially appears. Depending on the magnitude of the distributive effects
discussed below, it may not do enough to address the bargaining
capability concern that I have identified as the motivation for what
follows. 67 In particular, although my proposal may improve bargain-

ing outcomes for workers, it will not necessarily provide workers with
the resources needed to obtain job security. If that were the case,
further law reform might be in order. Meanwhile, though, workers
would still be better off, even if not as well off as they may deserve to
be.
It should be clear that the point of this exercise is to consider the
effects of alternative default rules on wealth distribution. In recent
years, law-and-economics scholars have produced an impressive body
of work on the efficiency implications of default-rule selection. 68
Efficiency enhancement, however, is not the focus of this Article. 69
Although workers might benefit from a more efficient default rule, I
am interested in the possibility of benefits unconnected with greater
efficiency.
II. DEFAULT RULES AND DISTRIBUTION
At first glance, it might seem easy to assume that switching the default rule from employment at will to job security would benefit workers. Other things remaining equal, workers presumably would prefer
job security to the risk of discharge at the will of the employer. If
See supraPart I.D.1.
68 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the
Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992) (showing how default rules can
affect strategic bargaining); Jason ScottJohnston, Strategic Bargainingand the Economic
Theory of ContractDefault Rules, 100YALE L.J. 615 (1990) (explaining the implications of
strategic bargaining for "penalty" default rules); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theoy of
DefaultRules for Commercial Contracts, 19J. LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990) (developing criteria
for the selection of optimal default rules).
In Part III, I consider whether the prevalence of at-will employment indicates
superior efficiency, but only in order to assess the argument for an at-will default rule
based on the avoidance of the costs of contracting around an inferior default. See infra
Part III.B.1.
r7
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changing the default rule could bring about this state of affairs, surely
this would be a change for the better. Of course, the problem with
this view is that other things would not remain equal. Because workers and employers must reach agreements satisfactory to each party,
employers cannot be forced to confer a benefit on workers if it is
costly to do so. If an employment agreement contains a job-security
clause, workers will presumably have to pay for it in the form of lower
wages. Such a reduction may be acceptable to workers because they
gain the benefit ofjob security. However, if workers value job security
less than its cost to employers, the parties presumably will bargain
around the job-security default and attempt to reach agreement on an
at-will basis instead. In short, whether workers would actually benefit
from a job-security default rule is more complex than a naive assessment might suggest. Nevertheless, this way of thinking seems to be
common. For example, in another context, the proliferation of new
forms of organization for small businesses purports to confer limited
liability on the owner-investors. ° Contract creditors, however, can be
expected to take this factor into account in pricing credit extensions.
They cannot be forced to accept limited liability without compensation for the increased risk of insolvency.7
An apparently more sophisticated view-associated with mainstream law and economics-would deny that changes in default rules
have any efficiency or distributive effects at all. These theorists argue
that, at least in the absence of transaction costs, contracting parties
will reach efficient outcomes regardless of the legally specified default
rule.7 That is, contracting parties will settle on a particular wage,
coupled with either an at-will or job-security term, as determined by
their calculations of self-interest. Furthermore, according to this
view, the choice of default rule will not have any distributive consequences, because the default rule, as a starting point for bargaining,
will not determine the amount of each party's share of the gains from
For an overview, see Allan W. Vestal, New and RevisedAmerican Laws for UnincorporatedFirms Create Significant Traps for the Unwary, in 2 PERSPEcrIVES ON COMPANY LAW
257 (Fiona Macmillan Patfield ed., 1997).
71 Potential tort creditors are in a different situation because they are unable to
bargain ex ante with potential injurers.
12 See, e.g., R.H. Coase, TheProblem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960) ("It is
always possible to modify by transactions on the market the initial legal delimitation of
rights. And, of course, if such market transactions are costless, such a rearrangement
of rights will always take place if it would lead to an increase in the value of production."). Note, however, that Coase was writing about property entitlements, not
contractual default rules. For a discussion of this distinction, see infra Part II.A.2.
70
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trade. Each party's gains will depend instead on such factors as the
parties' respective bargaining skills and leverage. Recent scholarship
modifies this view, positing that, under certain circumstances, choices
between alternative default rules may indeed affect efficiency. Although the question has received considerably less attention, such
choices may also have significant distributive consequences. This Part
considers that issue, but only after clarifying one way in which choices
between alternative default rules do not influence distribution.
A. Property Rules and ContractRules

1. Distributive Effects of Legal Rules
In his famous article The Problem of Social Cost, Professor Coase

shows that, under certain circumstances, the assignment of a legal
entitlement to one party over another makes no difference to the
allocation of resources.74 To illustrate this, Coase offers the example
of a farmer and a cattle rancher occupying adjacent properties. 75 The
rancher's cattle wander onto the farmer's land and damage her crops.
As the size of the rancher's herd increases, the amount of crop damage increases as well. 76 Coase contrasts two legal responses to this
situation. The law may assign to the farmer an entitlement to compensation for damage (or an injunction to prevent the damage from
occurring), or it may assign to the rancher an entitlement to inflict
damage on the farmer's crops.
Coase demonstrates that absent
transaction costs,78 the parties will bargain to the most efficient outcome regardless of which party receives the entitlement.7
Even though the initial assignment of the legal entitlement to one
party or the other makes no allocational difference in the absence of
transaction costs, the choice of initial assignment has significant
consequences for the distribution of wealth between the farmer and
the rancher."' If the cost to the farmer of the marginal steer is less
73 Seesources
7
75

cited supranote 68.

See Coase, supra note 72, at 2.
See id. at 2-3.

76 See

id. at 3.
See id.at 3-4.
78 Coase acknowledges that an assumption of no transaction costs
is "very unrealistic." Id. at 15.
79 See
id.
gVarious commentators have made this point. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN,
MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 71 (1988) ("The initial assignment of entitle7
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than its value to the rancher, the rancher will increase the size of her
herd regardless of the legal rule. However, if the farmer enjoys the
entitlement, she will be able to insist on compensation in some
amount sufficient to pay for her damage but still allow the rancher a
profit. If, instead, the law allows the rancher to damage the farmer's
crops without paying compensation, the rancher claims the full value
of the marginal steer, and the farmer is left to bear her loss without
compensation. Even if both results are equally efficient, the farmer
surely prefers one state of affairs to the other.
Likewise, if the farmer will sustain crop damage more costly than
the value to the rancher of the additional steer, a rule entitling her to
damages or an injunction will suffice to prevent the rancher from
enlarging the herd, as the cost to the rancher of doing so would be
greater than the benefit. However, if the rancher has the entitlement, the farmer will have to pay the rancher to refrain from enlarging the herd.8 ' Again, the allocational outcome is the same either
way, but the farmer is not indifferent.
Whatever the relationship between the value of crops and the
value of cattle, the party to whom the legal entitlement is assigned will
fare better in relation to the other party than she would if the opposite legal regime were in effect. If the farmer's property rights include a right to money damages or an injunction, she will be able to
insist on compensation for the crop damage caused by the rancher's
cattle. However, should the farmer enjoy no such entitlement, she
will either have to bear the loss, or, if it is cost-effective to do so, pay
the rancher not to raise the additional steer. The same analysis can
be applied to a variety of legal entitlements. A railroad company may

ment... does affect the relative wealth of the competing parties simply because the
assignment determines which party has to do the purchasing (or what economists
misleadingly call bribing)."); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
ECONOMICS 12 (2d ed. 1989) ("[A]ithough the choice of the legal rule does not affect
the attainment of the efficient solution when there are zero transaction costs, it does
affect the distribution of income."); MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES
TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 93 (1996) ("[E]ven in a world of zero transaction costs,
although every legal rule will lead to the efficient outcome, different legal rules will
have different [wealth-distribution] effects on the parties involved."); Harold Demsetz,
Wealth Distribution and the Ownership of Rights, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 223, 227-28 (1972)
(noting that the initial assignment of the legal entitlement "merely reclassifies costs
from explicit to implicit for the parties to the interaction," and that "such a reclassification is merely a way of describing the resulting redistribution of wealth.").
81 For the parties to reach an agreement, the amount of the payment will have to
be greater than the value to the rancher of the steer but less than the cost to the
farmer of the crop damage.
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or may not be liable for fires caused by sparks emitted from its trains
onto adjoining land. Homeowners living next to a factory may or
may not enjoy a right to clean air.8 A slaughterhouse may or may not
be responsible to landowners downstream for discharging refuse into
a river.8 Even though market prices ultimately will dictate investment
decisions, the law has a direct effect on how much each party stands
to gain or lose.
2. Property Versus Contract
Rules of the kind Coase analyzes may be termed "property entitlements" in order to contrast them with contract-based rights. The
law can give the farmer a right to compensation for damages caused
by a neighbor's cattle, or it can deny her a right to compensation, in
effect giving the neighboring rancher freedom to inflict damage on
the farmer's crops. In either event, the entitlement in question is a
creation of positive law, existing prior to and independently of any
contractual relationship between the parties. This is true of any
number of property rules that define the relationship between an
owner and those who infringe upon or are adversely affected by the
owner's efforts to enjoy the property in question.
Contract-based rights are not creations of positive law. Rather,
they arise out of bargains struck between parties to contractual relationships. Although property rules may give an owner rights to security of possession, if the owner seeks to sell the property, issues such as
the sale price, timing of the transfer, warranty, and the like, must be
determined contractually. Similarly, parties to an employment relationship define their respective rights and duties by means of a contract. Some terms may be supplied by law. Default rules specify terms
that will apply in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. Mandatory rules may also supply terms around which the parties are not
allowed to contract. In either case, however, such terms, and any

82

See SEIDENFELD, supra note 80, at 91-93 (analyzing the consequences of giving

the legal right to either the railroad (to set fires) or the landowner (to receive compensation for fire damage)).
See PoUiNSKY, supra note 80, at 11-14 (discussing the distributive effect of the
choice of legal rule).
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Technology, Politics,and RegulatedMonopoly: An American

HistoricalPerspectiv 62 TEx. L. REV. 1263, 1298 (1984) (discussing how the Louisiana
legislature's pro-slaughterhouse laws of the 1860s permitted butchers located upstream from New Orleans to discharge their animal wastes into the Mississippi River,
contaminating the city's drinking-water supply).
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others that the parties themselves choose, will confer fights or impose
duties only by virtue of a contractual relationship that the parties
voluntarily have undertaken.
To what extent do choices between alternative contractual default
rules have distributive consequences similar to those produced by
choices between rival property entitlements? Here is where one may
be tempted to analogize contractual default rules to Coase's property
entitlements.s5 A rule that gives a farmer a right to an injunction or
to money damages against a neighboring cattle rancher creates an
asset that can be the subject of bargaining and exchange. If it is
economical to do so, the cattle rancher will purchase this right from
the farmer by paying for the right to raise a herd that damages the
farmer's crops. The benefit to the rancher presumably exceeds the
cost of paying off the farmer. This process is what Coase has in mind
6
when he refers to the "rearrangement" of rights or to their transfer
7
and recombination.
The at-will employment rule (like other default rules) might be
thought about in a similar manner. If the worker is willing to pay the
price (in the form of lower wages), the employer will give up its right
of at-will discharge in favor of some kind of job-security agreement.
Presumably the worker will do this only if she values the job-security
term more highly than the forgone wages, while the employer will
agree only if it values the cost savings more highly than the burden of
a job-security contract term. Again, the legal rule, being a default
rule, is only a starting point for negotiations, the outcome of which
will be determined by economic considerations.
Does the choice of a starting point have distributive implications
similar to those that attend choices between rival property entitlements? Suppose, for example, that an employer values the cost savings of a large-scale layoff more highly than the workers value their
jobs. If employment is at-will, the employer can discharge the workers in question and realize the attendant cost savings. If the workers
enjoy some kind of right to job security, the employer should still be
able to compensate the workers for their losses and come out ahead.
The layoff happens either way. The difference is that in the former
situation, the workers do not receive compensation, while in the latter
s See Millon, Communitarianism, supranote 6, at 27.
"6Coase, supra note 72, at 15.
8' See id. at 8 ("It is necessary to know whether the damaging business is liable or
not for damage caused since without the establishment of this initial delimitation of
rights there can be no market transactions to transfer and recombine them.").
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situation, they do. Stated this way, the distributive picture looks like
the one we saw in the case of the cattle rancher and the farmer:
Workers are better off if the default rule is job security than if it is atwill. Superficially, at least, the bias that contractual default rules
embodyss seems analogous to the distributive advantage that one
party or the other receives from a property entitlement.
Any appearance of similarity is in fact misleading. The crucial difference between the employment case and Coase's adjoining landowners example results from the fact that the employer and the
worker are in a different kind of relationship than are the farmer and
the rancher. The job-security contract term exists only if the parties
directly affected by it have agreed to include it in the employment
contract. If a worker is to enjoy job security, the employer must first
agree. This means that the employer is in a position to make the
worker pay for whatever benefit the job-security contract term offers
to the worker, taking into account the increased cost that such a
provision imposes on the employer. Ifjob security involves costs that
employment at will does not, presumably the employer will make the
worker pay for it.s9 This is the importance of the difference between
contract-based rights and property entitlements, described by Professor Demsetz as the distinction between "exchange" and "nonexchange" situations. 9
'sAs discussed above, see supra text accompanying note 52, bias refers to the fact
that the at-will default rule gives employers, for example, the right to discharge workers without cause; if workers desire job security, the burden is on them to bargain for
it.
89 It is possible thatjob security would generate benefits as well as costs.
One line
of recent economic research draws on an extensive social psychology literature to
posit a connection between psychological well-being and productivity. One determinant of psychological health appears to be secure employment. See generally William
Darity, Jr. & Arthur H. Goldsmith, Social Psychology, Unemployment and Macroeconomics,
J. ECON. PERsP., Winter 1996, 121, 122-30 (discussing the negative psychological effects
of unemployment and relating them to lower productivity and other behavioral
phenomena among the employed).
goSee Demsetz, supra note 80, at 224-28. The point of the distinction for Demsetz
is that, generally speaking, changes in mandatory contract rules have no distributive
impact. See Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter2, 1J. LEGAL STUD. 13,
22 (1972) ("[W]hen there is no restriction on contracting, a change in the rule of
liability need not be accompanied by wealth redistribution."); see also Demsetz, supra
note 80, at 228. To illustrate, Demsetz discusses the problem of liability for on-the-job
accidents. See id. at 224-27. If employers are required by law to compensate workers
for on-the-job injuries, the cost of doing so is a cost of employing labor, and employers
must, consequently, pay a lower wage than they otherwise would. See id. at 225.
Workers accept the lower wage because it is supplemented by what amounts to accident insurance, obviating the need either to purchase insurance or to self-insure. The
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A job-security contract term does impose costs on employers that
are not present under an at-will regime. Most notably, if discharge is
lawful only in cases of worker misconduct or inadequate effort, there
is a substantive restriction on employers' freedom to make workforce
adjustments in response to market considerations. Faced with new
economic pressures, employers may find themselves stuck with workers whose marginal product is worth less than their marginal cost. If
they must compensate these workers in order to discharge them,
employers will want to take this cost into account in deciding how
much they are willing to pay for labor generally.
Procedurally, the job-security term will place the burden ofjustification on employers who have discharged a worker. Even if the
discharge is justifiable on grounds of malfeasance of some kind, a
disgruntled worker may still bring a wrongful-discharge lawsuit. The
bargaining process incorporates the costs and benefits of the new contract-based right
into the wage rate. See id. As Demsetz puts it: "It would seem that the distribution of
wealth between workers and [employers] is unaffected by the legal position because of
the offsetting alteration in explicit wages." Id.
In fact, Demsetz's result depends on an assumption that may be peculiar to the
example he chooses. Accident compensation involves cash transfers from the employer to injured workers. The cost to the employer is precisely equal to the dollar
value of the benefit paid to those workers who end up with a right to be compensated.
Under such circumstances (but assuming no valuation differences based on wealth
effects), both the labor supply and demand curves should shift by identical magnitude,
and the invariance result is as Demsetz posits. Seeid.
Different results can obtain, however, if the value of the benefit to the workers is
not equal to the cost to the employer. When might this be the case? Suppose that the
law mandates a job-security contract term. Employers in a particular market determine that the added cost of job security requires that they reduce wages by $3 per
hour. Assume also that, all other things being equal, workers prefer job security over
at-will employment. Because they prefer ajob-security contract term over at-will status,
they are willing to pay some amount for that benefit, perhaps in the form of reduced
wages. Just how much they are willing to pay--how large a wage reduction they will
accept-depends, of course, on how great a value they place on ajob-security guarantee. The value could conceivably be precisely equal to the cost that the employer must
bear, but there is no reason for why this has to be the case. The value that workers
place on job security may be greater or less than the term's $3 cost per hour to the
employer. This is simply an instance of the fact that the value of a good to one person
does not depend on how much it costs another to produce it. The invariance scenario
is likely only in situations in which the cost to the employer equals the benefit to the
workers. Although this may be the case with respect to benefits in the form of cash
transfers, invariance in cases involving noncash benefits would appear to be unlikely,
though not impossible.
Accordingly, if a mandatory job-security term were imposed, workers might be
better or worse off (or there might be no change) depending on the relationship
between the cost to the employer and the value of the benefit to the workers. For a
careful discussion of this issue, see Richard Craswell, Passingon the Costs of Legal Rules:
Efficiency and Distributionin Buyer-SellerRelationships,43 STAN. L. REv. 361 (1991).
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cost of defending against such a claim can be substantial, and there is
always at least some uncertainty as to the outcome. These considerations may encourage opportunistic litigation by creating settlement
leverage unrelated to whether the grievance is grounded in employer
bad faith or honest disagreement.9' In comparison to an at-will regime, the specter of higher litigation and settlement expenses increases the cost of using discharge as a mechanism for disciplining
workers who fail to live up to employer expectations. 92 Discharge is
not a perfect disciplinary device under an at-will regime either, because detection is costly and opportunistic litigation is still possible.
Nevertheless, shirking and other misconduct will be harder to punish
and, therefore, more likely to occur under a job-security contract
term than under an at-will term. This extra increment represents a
cost peculiar to a job-security regime, and it is a cost that employers
will seek to pass on to the work force.
Even if the job-security contract term allows for discharge in the
event of economic necessity, there are costs involved in exercising
that right, in addition to the costs involved in trying to discharge
underperforming workers. The uncertainty that can surround the
question of necessity may give rise to litigation. Success for the employer, if it comes, will likely be costly. That fact alone creates settlement leverage and may tend to encourage opportunistic litigation.
When a benefit like ajob-security term involves costs that the employer must bear, the employer will not simply assume that cost without attempting to reflect it in a lower wage. Whetherjob security is a
default rule, therefore, conceivably could make no difference. The
job-security term may be a negotiated departure from an at-will default rule, or it may itself be the default. Either way, the parties to the
employment contract will price the term in question, each taking into
account the costs and benefits of employment under a job-security
regime. Thus, although the farmer can insist on the full market value
of her legally assigned property right, the worker will not get the full
value to her of a job-security contract term, because that term will be
part of the bargain between the worker and the employer only if both
parties agree.
As Coase's analysis demonstrates, social choices about the assignment of property entitlements can have dramatic wealth effects, even
9, See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947,
970 (1984) (discussing the advantage of lower administrative costs associated with
contract at will).
". For a discussion of the at-will rule as a disciplinary device, see id. at 965.
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if such choices do not necessarily determine resource allocation. s In
contrast, although contractual default rules may be biased in favor of
one class of contracting parties or another, such rules do not determine the outcome of the bargaining process because the parties are
free to substitute an alternative to the default rule. Moreover, the
law's assignment of default-rule bias does not confer wealth on the
rule's beneficiaries in the same manner that a property entitlement
does, because the rule confers no rights at all in the absence of an
actual bargain. The bargaining process ensures that the beneficiary
of a contract term must pay for those gains one way or another, while
the party burdened by a term cannot be forced to bear a greater share
of such costs than she is willing to assume. Because the worker will
have to pay for the job-security contract term whether that term is a
default rule or a negotiated departure from an at-will default, the
distributive consequences of choices between default rules creating
contract-based rights are not as dramatic as those between alternative
property entitlements. 9 4 Whether there is any distributive significance
is discussed in the next subpart.
B. Default Rules and the Distributionof Gains
If one default rule benefits both workers and employers more
than its alternative, those seeking to improve the welfare of workers
would favor such a rule. This might occur if a particular default rule
increases efficiency in contracting outcomes. The flip side of this
point is that default-rule choices can also interfere with efficiency.
The default rule may express a contract term that is less desirable to
the parties than its alternatives. In such cases, the parties will attempt
to contract around the default to a superior alternative. Such efforts
are likely to generate costs. Even if the parties succeed, these costs
mean that the parties will end up less well off than they would have

93 See supra text accompanying notes 80-81.

9' If the efficiency and distributive effects are uncertain, one might be tempted to
conclude that social choices about default rules are unimportant. Professor Black has
suggested that, taken as a whole, the mandatory component of state corporate law is
trivial. See Bernard S. Black, Is CorporateLaw Trivial?: A Politicaland Economic Analysis,
84 Nw. U. L. REV. 542, 551-61 (1990) (arguing that mandatory rules mimic solutions
that parties would reach through bargaining, are avoidable, are unimportant, or tend
to be eliminated through an ongoing dynamic adjustment process). If corporate law's
mandatory rules are trivial, Black's analysis would seem to imply that its structure of
default rules must be as well, since these rules impose no restraints on the choices that
participants in corporate activity may make about the terms on which they contract

with each other.

1998]

DEFAULT RULES AND WEALTH DISTRIBUTION

1005

been had the more desirable term been the default rule. Under
certain circumstances, transaction costs may exceed the benefits to be
gained from avoidance of the default term. In such cases, the result
will be a contract that includes the inferior term. In either situation,
the contracting process yields less value than could have been realized had the opposite default rule been in effect.
Although the effect of default rules on efficiency is an important
question, 95 the remainder of this subpart focuses on the distribution
of gains from trade and whether workers may be better off under one
default rule rather than its alternative. This could be the case if ajobsecurity default rule results in employment contracts that include a
job-security term but at a wage higher than workers can obtain when
employment at will is the default rule. Alternatively, in bargaining
from the job-security default to an at-will contract term, employers
might pay a higher wage than they would have paid if the default rule
had been employment at will. Under either scenario, workers would
be better off under ajob-security default.
In thinking about how choices between alternative default rules
might enhance the wealth of workers, I wish to focus on a particular
mechanism. First, I discuss the "endowment effect" and the related
notion of "status quo bias." These terms describe how ownership of
an entitlement can affect the value placed on it by its owner. Then I
consider whether default rules might be subject to the endowment
effect even though default rules, by themselves, do not create entilements.' 6 Finally, I turn to the possibility that, if job security were
the default rule, the endowment effect might interfere with the ability
of workers and employers to reach agreements. 97
95For a brief discussion of the efficiency implications of default-rule selection, see
infra Part III.A.

See supra Part II.A.2 (contrasting property law entitlements with contract-based
rights).
97 This Article is not the first to appreciate the potential relevance
of the endowment effect to legal policy. For earlier discussions, see Jack M. Beermann &Joseph
William Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal Reasoning: The Example of Property in Jobs, 23
GA. L. REV. 911, 957-67 (1989); Herbert Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the Endowment
Effect, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1991); Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production
Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 678-85 (1979); Duncan
Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique 33 STAN. L. REV. 387,
401-21 (1981); Richard S. Markovits, Duncan's Do Nots: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the

Determination of Legal Entitlements, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1169, 1179-82 (1984); Stewart
Schwab, A CoaseanExperiment on Contract Presumptions, 17J. LEGAL STUD. 237, 260-61
(1988). The articles by Professors Hovenkamp, Kelman, Kennedy, and Markovits deal
with assignments of entitlements rather than choices between default rules. For a
critique of Hovenkamp's and Markovits's analyses and a proposal of his own, see
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1. The Endowment Effect
A number of experimental studies have confirmed the existence
of the endowment effect. In a wide variety of settings, investigators
have found that people tend to demand more to give up an entitlement that they own than they would be willing to pay for that entitlement if they did not own it. One commentator concludes from this
research that "the
endowment effect appears to be much greater than
98
once thought."
In one well-known experiment, the investigators distributed
coffee mugs to one group of students and told them they could exchange their mugs for a large Swiss chocolate bar.9 A second group
received chocolate bars that were exchangeable for mugs. A third
group was simply offered a choice between the mug and the candy.
In other words, the first and second groups enjoyed a property right
in an exchangeable item, while the third group was asked to choose
without reference to an ex ante entitlement position. Of the subjects
in the third group, 56% preferred the mug while 44% chose the
candy bar,99 indicating that, in the abstract, the mug and the candy
bar were of roughly equal value to them. However, among those who
owned a mug, only 11% chose to trade it for the candy bar.'0' Similarly, only 10% of the candy owners preferred the mug. 0 2 Ownership
appears to make people value what they have more highly than they
would if they did not own it and had to pay for it instead.

Russell Korobkin, Policymaking and the Offer/Asking Price Gap: Toward a Theory ofEfficient

Entitlement Allocation, 46 STAN. L. REv. 663, 676-97 (1994). Professors Beermann and
Singer discuss the endowment effect primarily in relation to property rights, but
suggest briefly and tentatively its possible relevance to default-rule selection. See
Beermann & Singer, supra, at 973-74. Professor Schwab's paper presents important
experimental data bearing on this question, but he touches only briefly on the endowment effect as a possible explanation for his results. See Schwab, supra, at 260-61;
infra notes 122-36 and accompanying text (discussing Schwab's research). In a newly
published article, Professor Korobkin presents empirical data bearing on the efficiency implications of status quo bias and default rules. See Russell Korobkin, The
Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CoRNELL L. REv. 608 (1998) [hereinafter
Korobkin, Status Quo Bias]. The present Article is the first to attempt a thorough
consideration of the endowment effect and the status quo bias as they relate to the
distributive consequences of choices between alternative default rules.
Hovenkamp, supra note 97, at 227.
9SeeJack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference

Curves,79 AM. ECON. REv. 1277, 1278 (1989).
"0 See id. at 1278.

101See id.
102 See id.
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In another experiment, investigators distributed mugs to half of a
group of students.1 13 These mug owners were asked to fill out a form
indicating the minimum amount of money they would demand in
order to sell their mugs. The remaining students, as prospective
buyers, were told to indicate the maximum amount they would be
willing to pay. Immediately after collecting the forms, the investigators calculated and announced the market-clearing price.1°4 This procedure was then repeated three more times. The purpose of the
repetition was to test whether disparities between willing-to-accept
and willing-to-pay prices would persist even in market contexts that
included opportunities for learning about market prices.0 5 The
results of the experiment confirmed that valuation disparities survive
even under such circumstances. Median buyer and seller reservation
prices remained nearly constant through all four of the06 markets, with
selling prices more than twice as high as buying prices.
A number of other experiments have yielded comparable results.'0

7

Experimental data have been consistent with a number of

studies that relied on surveys rather than on actual trading. Much of

'03 SeeDaniel Kahneman et al., ExperimentalTests of the EndowmentEffect and the Coase
Theorem, 98J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1330-33 (1990).
4 The price was determined by the intersection of the supply and demand curves.
See id. at 1330-31.
10' It was announced in advance that one of the four markets would be selected at

random and all trades would be implemented. See id. This procedure encouraged the
subjects to be honest in their valuations in each of the four markets.
,o6 See id. at 1332. The markets-for-mugs experiment described in the text above
indicates that high willing-to-accept prices can persist even in the face of knowledge
that the market price is lower.
107 For additional experiments, see, for example, David S. Brookshire & Don L.
Coursey, Measuring the Value of a Public Good: An Empirical Comparison of Elicitation
Procedures,77 AM. ECON. REV. 554 (1987); Kahneman et al., supranote 103, at 1333-42;
Knetsch, supra note 99, at 1279-81;Jack L. Knetsch &J.A. Sinden, Willingness to Pay and
Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of
Value 99 Q.J. ECON. 507 (1984) [hereinafter Knetsch & Sinden, Willingness to Pay].
For a useful summary of experimental findings of valuation disparity in tabular form,
see Kahneman et al., supra note 103, at 1327 tbl.1. Under certain highly artificial
circumstances, subjects' willing-to-accept and willing-to-pay prices may converge after
repeated transactions. See Don L. Coursey et al., The Disparity Between Willingness to
Accept and Willingness to Pay Measures of Value, 102 Q.J. ECON. 679, 682-89 (1987)
(discussing an experiment involving the tasting of an extremely unpleasant substance). These results have been criticized. SeeJack L. Knetsch & J.A. Sinden, The
Persistenceof EvaluationDisparities,102 Q.J. ECON. 691 (1987) (pointing out, inter alia,
that disparities persisted even in the experiment discussed in Coursey et al., supra).
For a general discussion of experimental data on the endowment effect, see Daniel
Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, J. ECON.
PERSP., Winter 1991, at 193, 194-99.
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this work has involved the valuation of environmental goods. 0° For
example, hunters who were questioned about the possible loss of a
duck habitat said that they would demand an average of $1044 to
accept the loss, but would be willing to pay an average of only $247 to
prevent it.'9 In another survey, subjects were surveyed regarding
various levels of air-quality deterioration." They indicated that they
would require from five to sixteen times more compensation to accept this loss than they would be willing to pay to avoid it.
The general point that emerges from this substantial body of research is that people tend to demand more to give up an entitlement
than they would be willing to pay in order to acquire it. "Thus,
money or assets that are considered by individuals to be part of their
endowment seem to be valued more highly-it takes a more advantageous offer for them freely to give them up-than money or assets
that are not considered to be included in their present endowDifferences between willing-to-accept and willing-to-pay
ment."'"
measures of value often appear to be quite substantial-too substantial to be attributed entirely to wealth or income effects." Valuation
existing endowment serving as a
is context-driven, with a11person's
3
powerful reference point.
'8 See, e.g., R.G. CUMMINGS ET AL., VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS (1986); JUDD
HAMMACK & GARDNER MALLARD BROWN, JR., WATERFOWL AND WETLANDS (1974);

Philip A. Meyer, Publicly Vested Values for Fish and Wildlife: Criteria in Economic Welfare
and Interface with the Law, 55 LAND ECON. 223 (1979); Robert D. Rowe et al., An Experiment in the Economic Value of Visibility, 7J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1 (1980); William D.
Schulze et al., Valuing Environmental Commodities: Some Recent Experiments, 57 LAND
ECON. 151 (1981).
,'9See HAMMACK& BROWN, supra note 108, at 26-27.
",oSeeRowe et al., supra note 108, at 1-3.
.. Knetsch & Sinden, Willingness to Pay, supra note 107, at 516 (citing Richard
Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 43-47
(1980)). In other words, marginal utility curves for money (and other assets and
entitlements) appear to have a "kink" at the point of an individual's current level of
wealth. The curve slopes much more steeply to the left of that point than it does to
the right, indicating that people weigh subtractions much more heavily than additions.
See Hovenkamp, supra note 97, at 228 ("[T]he burden of a downward shift in one's
standard of living is felt more heavily than is the benefit of an upward shift of the same
dollar amount.").
12 See Knetsch & Sinden, Willingness to Pay, supra-note 107, at 516 ("[T]he magnitude of the values at issue should rule out the income or wealth effect as being an
adequate explanation of the observed variation between the two measures."). Wealth
effects in the experiments described in the text above presumably were insignificant.
113 One implication of the endowment effect is that an individual's indifference
curve as to two goods is nonreversible, contrary to a basic assumption of neoclassical
welfare economics. If a person's valuation of a good depends on whether he or she
owns it, exchange rates between that good and another will depend on whether the
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The reasons for the endowment effect remain uncertain. Investigators have speculated that people assess change by reference to
existing circumstances and conditions, including their current endowment of wealth."4 Opportunities for trade represent departures
from these reference points. More specifically, such changes are
evaluated as gains or losses relative to a reference point, rather than
simply as opportunities to exchange particular goods for more highly
valued goods." 5 For instance, when selling items of value, people
behave as if such changes represent a loss relative to their current
endowments. Accordingly, they demand a higher price as compensa-

tion than they would be willing to pay to acquire the same assets if
they did not own them. Acquisition represents an increase in wealth
relative to the reference point, but the increase is not valued as highly
as the perceived loss. Knetsch and Sinden suggest that this phenomenon illustrates a psychological disposition to guard against
future regret. The possibility of regret, evidently more potent when
assessing potential losses than potential
gains, is a cost that is factored
'6
into calculation of selling prices.
More generally, people seem to have a strong tendency to prefer
the status quo. A multipart questionnaire administered by Professors
Samuelson and Zeckhauser revealed that, given a choice between
alternatives both involving departure from the status quo, people
behave differently than when the choice is between maintaining the
status quo and moving to an alternative." 7 For example, one set of
Samuelson and Zeckhauser's questions instructed the subjects to
choose among several investment alternatives. Remaining with a
current investment was not among the choices; in this sense, all
choices were neutral or on the same footing. Another group was
given a choice between retaining their current portfolios or choosing
among the same menu of options offered to the first group. The
percentage of respondents favoring a particular choice was highest
when it was in the status quo position and lowest when it was framed

exchange rates between that good and another will depend on whether the person is
giving up or acquiring the good in question. See Knetsch, supra note 99, at 1282-83.
,,4
See Knetsch & Sinden, Willingness to Pay, supra note 107, at 516-17.
" SeeKahneman et al.,
supra note 107, at 199.
1,6See Knetsch & Sinden, Willingness to Pay, supra note 107, at
517.
17 See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo
Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1988) (concluding that "decision makers exhibit a
significant status quo bias").
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as an alternative to the status quo. When offered as a neutral alternative, the response rate was intermediate between these two. " 8
Another study drew conclusions from an analysis of two groups of
electricity consumers. " 9 One group lived in an area with reliable
service but relatively high prices; the other lived in an area with less
reliable service but lower rates. When surveyed about their preferences as between several combinations of varying levels of reliability
and price, approximately 60% of the consumers in each group preferred to remain with the status quo of their own group, while only
approximately 6% chose the status quo of the other group.2 The
endowment effect, which leads people to value assets more highly if
they own them than if they are considering buying them, appears to
be an instance of this more general preference for the status quo.
2. Default Rules as Endowments
Even if the endowment effect applies to valuation of entitlements,
it is not at all clear that it is relevant to rights specified by contractual
default rules. This is because, as discussed above, contractual default rules themselves do not create entitlements. The right or duty
specified by a default rule becomes effective only if the term is embodied in a contract. Further, the party burdened by the right must
agree to take up the burden, so the beneficiary explicitly or implicitly
pays for the benefit. This is important because, although default
rules are biased in favor of particular classes of individuals, the beneficiaries of such biases do not necessarily gain any value by virtue of
that bias.
More concretely, ajob-security default rule would not itself confer
job security on workers. Employers would have to agree to hire workers on that basis, and, if they did, workers would have to pay for the
benefit in the form of a lower wage. Further, if at-will employment
were more efficient than job security (and transaction costs were not
excessive), the parties would contract around the default rule anyway.
Because a job-security default rule would not create an entitlement,
"

See id. at 14-15 (finding in the results "an obvious and revealing pattern" of

favoring the status quo). Five other studies structured in a similar manner produced
the same conclusions. See id. at 19-26 (reporting the results of the surveys).
'9 See Raymond S. Hartman et al., ConsumerRationality and the Status Quo, 106 Q.J.

ECON. 141,158-61 (1991).
120

See id. at 149. Each group possessed similar demographic, income, and electric-

ity-consumption characteristics. See id. at 154.
12

See supra Part II.A.2.
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the endowment effect would not necessarily have any bearing on the
wealth of workers ifjob security replaced at-will as the default rule.
Even though default rules do not represent endowments, there is
evidence that people behave as if they do. Valuations of potential
contract terms seem to differ according to whether a term enjoys
default-rule status. Further, when engaged in contract negotiations,
beneficiaries of a right specified by a default rule appear to achieve
better results than if the default rule were the opposite.
This advantage is evident in an important article by Professor
Schwab reporting the results of a carefully designed experiment
simulating bargaining in the labor context.2 Two hundred twenty
students from two classes were divided into two groups, one group
representing a union and the other an employer. Individual union
and employer negotiators were paired with each other. The pairs
were then broken down into two sets. One set of parties bargained
against the background of a default rule that forbade the employer to
transfer work from a union to a nonunion plant; for the other set, the
default rule allowed transfer.'2 3 Pairs of bargainers were instructed to
reach an agreement regarding wages, number of vacation days, and
the employer's right to transfer work. Individual students received
"preference sheets" specifying the number of points that could be
earned for various bargaining outcomes. The objective was for each
bargainer to obtain a contract including as many points as possible.
The investigators did not provide24the students with information about
their counterparts' preferences.

Schwab found that 80% of the 108 completed contracts failed to
maximize fully the available gains from trade.'2 5 These results, therefore, did not support the hypothesis that bargainers would always
reach the optimally efficient outcome regardless of the default rule.
The choice between alternative default rules, however, had no effect

See Schwab, supra note 97, at 238.
See Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 265 N.L.R.B. 206, 208-10
(1982) (presumptively forbidding transfer), rev'd on reh'g; 268 N.L.R.B. 601, 601 (1984)
(presumptively allowing transfer), affdsub nomUAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175, 184 (D.C.
122
123

Cir. 1985) (affirming the decision of the NLRB because the company "acted without
antiunion animus for purely economic reasons and fulfilled any statutory obligations
to bargain that it might have had").
124 See Schwab, supra note 97, at 246-49.
12

See id. at 251.
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they were just as
on whether the parties reached efficient agreements;
26
regime.
default-rule
either
under
likely to do so
Although differences in the work-transfer default rule had no impact on efficiency, they did have significant distributive consequences.
When the default was a prohibition on the employer transferring
work from a union to a nonunion production facility, the resulting
contracts were significantly more favorable to the union than when
the default rule was the opposite. That is to say, the union negotiators ended up with more points when no-transfer was the default
rule.127 Correspondingly, employers did significantly better when the
default rule allowed freedom of transfer.12 This was true regardless
of whether the specified preferences indicated that a right to transfer
was efficient or inefficient.
The default rule allowed the party it favored to achieve a better
outcome than if the default were biased the other way. The notransfer default, however, did not benefit workers by making it more
likely that actual contracts would contain a no-transfer term. The
parties tended toward efficient outcomes, which did not necessarily
include the term expressed by the default rule.'2 Nevertheless, when
no-transfer was the default rule, workers earned a larger share of the
gains from trade.10 The default rule, although it did not create an
entitlement, did appear to confer bargaining leverage on the party it
favored. Schwab concludes that "the contract presumption increases
bargaining power. 3 Bargainers do better when the contract presump'
tion favors them."'

126

See id. at 252-53. The investigators assigned points to various bargaining out-

comes such that under one scenario, the no-transfer clause was efficient while under
the other scenario, the freedom-to-transfer clause was efficient. The contract term
restricting transfer would be efficient if the instructions specified that the union
valued the restriction on the employer's right more highly than the employer valued
freedom-to-transfer. Conversely, a contract term allowing transfer would be efficient if
the employer valued it more highly than the union valued a no-transfer alternative
term. See id.at 249.
" See id.at 254.
in See id.at 255.
'2 See id. at 257 (concluding that "these bargainers seem driven toward efficiency
rather than toward the presumption").
" As indicated in table four, the union earned a mean of 1278 points under the
no-transfer default, but only 1192 under the opposite default rule. The employer
achieved correspondingly better results when the default rule allowed transfer. See id.
at 254 tbl.4 (stating that the management team achieved 1774 points when right-totransfer was the default and 1696 when it was not).
'S' Id. at 257.
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Although Schwab offers some suggestive speculations,' 2 the reasons for his results are not clear. It is possible that the endowment
effect is at work.'33 When the contract term expressed by the default
rule was not efficient, the parties tended to pursue the efficient alternative. However, they behaved as if the default rule's presumption
was an asset that its beneficiary had to be persuaded to sell to the
other party. So, when the efficient contract term was right-to-transfer
but the default wvas no-transfer, union negotiators could insist on
compensation for "giving up" the default term. If instead the default
allowed transfer, they owned no "right" that they could sell to the
employer, and therefore gained less from the resulting contract 3 4 As
Schwab puts it, "bargainers in this experiment acted as if they must
purchase the right when the legal presumption favored the other
"
party and thus were in a weaker bargaining position.

13

When the default rule was also the efficient contract term, the
parties similarly acted as if the law endowed the rule's beneficiary with
an asset. If a no-transfer contract term was efficient and was the
default rule, the employer was apparently less able to make the union
pay for that benefit (presumably in the form of a lower wage) because, in effect, the union already "owned" it. However, if the default
was right-to-transfer, the union was perceived by the parties as having
to buy the no-transfer right from the employer. Even though the
parties moved toward the efficient contract term in all cases, the
choice between default rules made a difference. The rule's bias
functioned as an entitlement and thereby improved bargaining out3
comes for the rule's beneficiaries. 1
Another experimental study provides further support for
Schwab's findings on the tendency of bargainers to regard default
rules as entitlements. 137 In a study of consumer decisions about

"' See id. at 256-61 (attributing the results to the peculiarities of the labor context
or, in the context of bargaining in general, the signaling or value-enhancing effects).
"" Cf id. at 260 (positing a "'general hesitation effect' of contract presumptions,"

under which parties are generally hesitant to waive presumptions that are "theirs").
' When a right-to-transfer term was efficient but no-transfer was the default,
Schwab's union negotiators achieved a mean of 1229 points; when right-to-transfer was
the default, however, they realized a mean of only 1137 points. Seeid. at 254 tbl.4.

Id. at 254.
When no-transfer was both the efficient contract term and the default rule, the
union negotiators earned a mean of 1320 points. However, when no-transfer was the
"

156

default, they realized a mean of only 1250 points. See id. at 254 tbl.4.
'37 See EricJ. Johnson et al., Framing ProbabilityDistortions, and InsuranceDecisions, 7
J.RISK& UNCERTAINTY 35, 46-48 (1993).
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automobile liability insurance, the study's investigators divided the
subjects into three groups. Members of one group were asked to
imagine that they had just moved to a new state and had to choose
between two standard policies: one that gave the insured the full
right to sue for auto-related injuries, and another that restricted that
right but cost 11% less.le In contrast to this neutral choice, the other
two groups were told that the standard insurance policy included
either an unlimited or limited right to sue as the default option.
Members of these groups were asked whether they would be willing to
reject the default term and select the nonstandard alternative instead.
Of those for whom the unrestricted right to sue was the default, 53%
preferred to retain that right. 39 In contrast, when the default was a
"
limited right to sue, only 23% chose to acquire the full right.
Members of the full-right default group indicated that they were
willing to pay an average of 32% more for the full right, while the
willing to pay no more than an average of 8%
limited-right group was
4
'
to acquire that right.'

Data regarding actual insurance decisions tend to confirm these
experimental findings. 42 In Pennsylvania, recent insurance law
changes provide a full right to sue as the default option. In contrast,
New Jersey offers a limited right to sue as the default, with the opportunity to acquire the full right for a higher premium. Only about
20% of New Jersey consumers have chosen the full right to sue, while
that right.1
approximately 75% of Pennsylvanians have retained
Like the subjects in Schwab's study, actual consumers behave as if
the full right to sue is worth more when embodied in a default rule
than when the default rule is the opposite. In Pennsylvania, a significant majority prefers the right to sue even though they must pay a
higher premium for it. For residents of New Jersey, however, the
same right is not worth the extra cost. If Schwab's findings are typical, such valuation differentials should affect actual bargaining outcomes. Pennsylvanians ought to end up with a better package of
coverage and price because, as "owners" of an "entitlement" conSee id- at 47.
See id.
140 See id.
"s

"39

' See id. For the neutral group, 48% preferred the full right to sue and were
willing to pay an average of 23% more for policies including that right than they would
for a restricted right-to-sue policy. Seeid.
4 See id. at 48.
' See id. Note that the observed differential is actually larger than that yielded by
the hypothetical study.

1998]

DE4FAULTRULES AND WEALTHDISTRIBUTION

1015

ferred by law, consumers and insurance companies alike should
behave as if the consumers do not have to pay as much for the right as
they would if the opposite default rule were in effect. Given the
observed differences in valuation, one would expect that these different default-rule choices have left Pennsylvanians better off than their
counterparts on the other side of the Delaware River.'4
A recently published experimental study by Professor Korobkin
provides further evidence of the tendency to value contract terms
more highly when they enjoy default-rule status. Korobkin asked law
students to assume the role of attorneys advising a client (an overnight package delivery service) about the desirability of various contract terms.14 In three scenarios, subjects were presented with default
rules and asked how much they would recommend that the client
demand in return for agreeing to terms overriding the defaults. In
each situation, the subjects showed a marked preference for the terms
expressed as default rules. Thus, where the default was the familiar
Hadley v. Baxendale foreseeability limitation on damages liability,
subjects recommended significantly higher compensation for an
unlimited damages term than they were willing to pay in order to add
the limitation to avoid an unlimited damages default. 46 The subjects
behaved similarly when the issue was whether impossibility should
excuse nonperformance' 47 and also when the issue was whether, in
case of litigation, each party should pay its own attorneys' fees or
48
whether instead the losing party should pay the fees of the winner.
144

It would be interesting to compare the premiums paid by Pennsylvania insureds

with those of NewJersey policyholders who chose the right-to-sue option. However, it
would be necessary to keep in mind that many factors other than differences in
valuation of the right to sue could explain premium variations. Various factors might
combine to make motor vehicle ownership and operation more risky in New Jersey
than in Pennsylvania, resulting in higher insurance premiums for similar coverage. As
it happens, New Jersey residents pay the highest prices for automobile insurance in
the United States. See Devon Spurgeon, Auto Insurance Is DrivingForce in N.J. Election,
WASH. POsT, Oct. 25, 1997, atA4.
'4 See Korobkin, Status Quo Bias, supra note 97, at 634-36.
,4"The subjects recommended an average minimum of $6.96 per package to waive
the foreseeability limitation default. In contrast, where unlimited damages was the
default, they counseled the client to pay no more than $4.46 to add the limitation. See
id. at 639.
147 The subjects demanded a minimum of $302,000 to accept elimination of the
excuse where the default rule was impossibility as an excuse but were willing to pay no
more than $78,000 to add an impossibility term to the contract. Seeid. at 643.
148 When the default rule required parties to pay their own expenses,
59% of the
subjects preferred that term while, when the default was loser-pays, only 28% perferred the each-party-pays-its-own-expenses term. See id. at 647 tbl.1. In this scenario,
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Like Schwab's simulated labor negotiations and the automobile insurance experiment, Korobkin's study demonstrates that valuations of
contract terms are influenced by whether terms are embodied in
the objects of exchange are not actual
default rules, even though
49
entitlements.
property
The research discussed here strongly suggests that the endowment effect and status quo bias apply to rights specified in default
rules as well as to actual entitlements. Workers would be better off if
job security were the default rule, because they would value that right
more highly than they do under the current at-will regime. In practical terms, this means that even if workers ended up with employmentat-will contracts, they could expect a higher wage than they receive
under the current at-will default regime because they would obtain
compensation for "waiver" of the job-security default term. Employers, too, would expect to pay a higher wage to induce workers to
contract around the default. If bargaining instead resulted in employment contracts that retained the job-security default term, workers also would be better off than they are under the at-will default.
Both parties would behave as if workers already "owned" the jobsecurity right and therefore did not have to buy it from employers,
thus pushing wages higher than if at-will were the default rule. In
short, contrary to economic orthodoxy, changing the current default
rule to job security could have significantly favorable distributive
consequences for workers.
The analysis offered here is not limited to the choice between atwill and job-security default rules. Those interested in improving the
bargaining position of other nonshareholder constituencies might
resort to the same strategy. For example, the limited-liability default
rule could be changed to a presumption of unlimited liability. Contract creditors would stand to improve their positions because they

Korobkin also provided a third, neutral situation in which the rule required a contract
to include one term or the other. The distribution of the subjects' preferences as
between the two alternatives was markedly different from that resulting from the loserpays default, indicating the influence of the default rule on the subjects' preferences.
The distribution resulting from the each-party-pays default was similar to that resulting
from the neutral situation, which Korobkin suggests was due to the subjects' tendency
to regard each-party-pays as if it were in fact the default option in either case. Seeid.
9 Korobkin refers to these quasi-entitlements as "illusory endowments." Id. at
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would capture a larger share of gains from trade.'O I find the case for
protecting contract creditors less compelling than the case for worker
protection, because the bargaining capability argument deployed
above151 is less applicable to creditors than to workers, at least as a
general proposition. Even so, however, it should be clear now that
the current tidal wave of legislation extending limited liability to
152
small businesses is not a benign development as between contract
creditors and business owners. Extension of limited liability obviously
prejudices the interests of future tort victims even further than corporate law's current legal regime does.5 3 What has gone unappreciated
are the negative distributive consequences for contract creditors, too.
3.The Endowment Effect and Market Efficiency
Because owners of entitlements place a higher value on them
than do prospective buyers, the endowment effect can lead to fewer
trades of such entitlements than would occur if valuation were indeAs the gap between buyers' and sellers'
pendent of ownership.!
valuations widens, the possibility of a mutually advantageous trade
diminishes. If a job-security default rule really would lead workers to
value that right more highly than they do now, is it possible that they
would value that term so highly as to reduce the ability of workers and
employers to reach employment agreements? Such a result seems
unlikely for two reasons.
First, changing the default rule would not necessarily lead to a
lower number of employment contracts, because the higher value
that workers would place on job security might offset the higher value
that employers currently place on the at-will contract term under the
at-will default regime. Workers would demand higher prices for atwill contracts, but employer reservation prices would also increase
because employers would no longer "own" the at-will "entitlement"

130Tort

creditors might gain even more, because the absence of bargaining would

prevent corporate tortfeasors from attempting to make potential tort victims pay for
the benefit of unlimited liability ex ante.
..
1 See supra Part I.D.1.
112

See supra note 70 and accompanying text.

. On the inefficiency of limited liability as to tort creditors, see, for example,
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for
Corporate Torts, 100 YALE LJ. 1879, 1879-81 (1991), and David W. Leebron, Limited
Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors,91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1584 (1991).
154See Kahneman et al., supra note 103, at 1326-29 (discussing the endowment
effect and market efficiency).
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conferred by the default rule. Likewise, employers would be willing
to pay a higher wage under a job-security contract because workers
would no longer have to "buy" the job-security term. Even though
there is no reason to assume that the effects of the default-rule
change on employer and worker valuations would offset each other
precisely, it still seems possible that market efficiency would be largely
unaffected.
In addition, there is a built-in safeguard against workers valuing
job security so highly as to prevent them from accepting higher-wage
offers within the price range acceptable to employers. Pricing of
default rules differs from pricing of consumer goods and other property rights in an important way. As discussed previously, a default rule
confers no actual value on its beneficiary; its value depends on the
ability to incorporate it into a contract or to waive it-on favorable
terms in either case. A worker, therefore, does not have a meaningful
choice between "keeping" the default rule and exchanging it for
something else. Refusal to exchange means unemployment, and the
existence of a favorable default rule provides no substitute for the
benefits that go with work. In this respect, the worker differs from
the owner of an asset that may be consumed or invested. The owner
may be better off by declining a trade that offers less value than retention of the asset in question. Accordingly, even though ajob-security
default rule might well improve bargaining outcomes for workers, the
nature of the value that it creates is not likely to have the same kind of
effect on trading behavior that reassignment of a genuine entitlement
might have. Workers have a powerful incentive to adjust their valuations ofjob security to facilitate agreements with employers. Reversal
of the endowment effect should lead employers to offer higher wages
whether the employment contract is to include an at-will or a jobsecurity term. Workers will seize the benefits of these higher offers
rather than pricing themselves out of the market. Workers therefore
stand to be better off than under the current default-rule regime, and
there need be no reduction in the volume of employment contracting.
In this Part, I have presented an argument for changing the current at-will default rule to a job-security default rule as a law reform
strategy. Choices between alternative default rules can have an impact on wealth distribution, though not for the reason that property
entitlements do. Rather, the endowment effect and status quo bias
appear to affect contracting behavior by influencing valuation of the
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rights expressed by default rules. As a result, beneficiaries of default
rules stand to realize larger shares of gains from trade even though
default rules themselves do not confer entitlements.
III. DEFAULT RuLEs AND EFFICIENCY

The previous Part argued that ajob-security default rule could assist workers in obtaining a larger share of gains from trade in employment contracts. As discussed, this outcome is possible whether
contracts end up including an at-will or a job-security term. If the
default rule is job security but it turns out that an at-will term is more
efficient, the parties will seek to include an at-will term in their contract. For those who do, there will be costs involved in contracting
around the job-security default. It is conceivable that the workers'
share of these transaction costs could exceed the distributive gains
brought about by the job-security default rule. In that case, workers
would be worse off than they would be with an at-will default rule. ' 55
Again assuming that an at-will contract term is superior to a jobsecurity term, it is also possible that the costs involved in contracting
around a job-security default could be high enough to prevent workers and employers from obtaining the superior contract term. In that
case, workers would not necessarily incur significant transaction
costs,' 56 but the efficiency loss conceivably could be greater than the

amount by which the workers' share of the gains from trade under a
job-security default would exceed what they would have realized
under an at-will default rule.'57 Both of the possibilities suggested
here consider the potential impact of transaction costs on worker
well-being. Either provides an argument against switching to a job"-'By way of a simple example, assume that an at-will term is more efficient than a

job-security term. Assume further that, under an at-will default rule, workers would
receive $12 per hour for an at-will contract but only $9 for a contract including ajobsecurity term. If, in contrast, the default rule were job security, assume that the
endowment effect would result in workers receiving $13 and $10 for at-will and jobsecurity contracts, respectively. In the job-security default-rule scenario, if transaction
costs are less than the amount of the wage differential, the parties will contract on an
at-will basis and workers will receive $13.

However, transaction costs might still be

high enough that the net value of the resulting contract would be less than what it
would have been under an at-will default-rule regime ($12).
'6 Of course, bargaining over an at-will term without reaching agreement would
involve transaction costs.
117 Simplifying again (and referring to the values used in note 155, supra), if
transaction costs are high enough to block adoption of an at-will term when the
default isjob security, workers will find themselves with a contract worth $10. If the

default rule had been at-will, they could have received $12.
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security default even if one seeks to enhance workers' wealth by
means of the analysis advanced in Part II above.""
There are two possible responses to these arguments for retaining
the at-will default rule. First, one may question whether the costs
involved in moving from a job-security default to an at-will contract
term likely would be significant in magnitude. I think it is reasonably
likely that they would not be. This is not a situation where the parties
must create a customized contract term out of whole cloth. Instead,
long experience has given the at-will contract term reasonably definite meaning. By including language to the effect that employment
shall be at-will according to the common law understanding of that
phrase, parties can readily adopt the traditional contract term by a
simple reference to it. Under these circumstances, the at-will alternative to a job-security default would function as an easily selected "offthe-rack" option.
Another response to the transaction cost savings argument for an
at-will default rule would question whether there is good reason to
assume that at-will employment is more efficient than job security. In
the remainder of this Part, I consider the most obvious argument in
favor of at-will's superior efficiency. Simply put, its prevalence in this
country in actual contracting practice assertedly provides powerful
evidence of its efficiency. If, however, the status quo does not deserve
a presumption of superiority, some other argument would be needed.
Absent such an argument, there would be no basis for retaining the
at-will default rule because of its superior efficiency. For the reasons
discussed below, I conclude that the efficiency question is far more
uncertain than it is typically assumed to be. In particular, recent
research casts serious doubt on the status quo's presumed efficiency. 59 That being so, I suggest that concerns about the efficiency
effects of a change in the default rule should not deter efforts to
realize the potential distributive benefits already considered.
A. Default Rules and TransactionCost Savings

If a particular contract term is likely to be beneficial for most
people, it makes sense for the law to incorporate that term in a de-

'58
Note, however, that ifjob security is more efficient than at-will employment, a
job-security default rule would eliminate one source of transaction costs in addition to
altering the distribution of gains from trade.
"' Recent economic research also indicates the possible superiority ofjob security,
see supranote 89.
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fault rule, because default status saves the parties the costs involved in
contracting around a less-favored alternative. For example, if both
workers and employers typically favor at-will status but the default rule
is job security, costs may be involved in drafting appropriately welltailored at-will terms.' 6 Failure to do the job well enough may leave
one or the other party disappointed if they reach agreement as to
certain rights and duties but fail to specify those rights completely.
Where there is no agreement on an issue, vagueness creates uncertainty about the future. Parties who would prefer at-will, but for some
reason overlook the existence of a job-security default, bear the costs
of their oversight. The same considerations would apply under the
current default-rule regime ifjob security were more efficient than atwill. If efficiency is the objective, both contracting parties generally
stand to benefit if the default rule is the term they would choose for
themselves.
This is not the only way in which default-rule choice can promote
efficiency. Under certain circumstances, default rules can alleviate
informational asymmetries that lead to suboptimal bargains by inducing a party to reveal information that would otherwise be unavailable
to the other party. 16 In the employment context, a job-security default rule might enhance efficiency by facilitating signaling strategies
62
Despite the
that reveal information about prospective workers.
'
1..

See, e.g., POLINSKY, supra note 80, at 27.
See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic

Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE LJ. 87, 97 (1989) ("[Plenalty default rules can be
justified as a way to encourage the production of information.").
162At the time of contract formation, the value of an employment relationship to
the employer depends on the worker's future effort. Employers typically are in the
dark about whether a prospective worker is a high-effort type, a low-effort type, or
somewhere in the middle. Readily observable traits are not revealing, and reputational data either will be unavailable or costly to acquire and of possibly doubtful
reliability. Because workers presumably know their own type, there exists an informational asymmetry. (The asymmetry potentially is bilateral because workers may lack
knowledge about the propensity of a prospective employer to engage in opportunistic
discharge, but reputational data may be more reliable on this question, and the
informational asymmetry therefore less prominent.)
Unable to discriminate according to effort type, the employer pays a single wage
that reflects the distribution of high- and low-effort types in the relevant worker
population. This weighted average will be lower than the wage that would be paid to
high-effort workers alone, and higher than what low-effort workers alone would
receive. It is termed a "pooling equilibrium." Under such circumstances, high-effort
workers have an incentive to identify--or "signal-their type to prospective employers in order to improve their earnings. Effective signaling may be difficult, however,
because it requires that the'cost of acquiring and deploying the signal be lower for the
type of worker identified by the signal than for others. Absent such a cost differential,
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potential relevance of these ideas, my focus here is on the argument
for the at-will default rule's superior efficiency based on the prevalence of at-will employment in actual contracting practice.
B. Efficiency and the Status Quo

1. The Efficiency of the Status Quo
Law-and-economics scholarship has often assumed that the status
quo is, or at least tends to be, more efficient than its altematives.' 63
high- and low-effort types can both use the signal, making it impossible for the former
to separate themselves from the latter. See generally Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling; 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973).
If an effective signaling strategy is feasible, a
.separating equilibrium" can emerge, according to which high- and low-effort workers
are paid different wages according to their respective value to the firm.
My suggestion is that, ifjob security were the default rule, offering to work on an
at-will basis may be a way for high-effort workers to signal their type. This is based on
the intuition that high-effort workers should be more willing to accept at-will employment than low-effort workers because high-effort workers are less concerned about the
employer's freedom to discharge. High-effort workers presumably believe themselves
to be less likely to be fired for shirking or other malfeasance because they do not
expect to engage in such behavior. Low-effort workers, in contrast, value more highly
the protection afforded by ajob-security contract term. The difference in cost of atwill employment suggests that offering to work on an at-will basis could be a feasible
signaling strategy. If so, a more efficient separating equilibrium could be the result.
Besides facilitating valuable information revelation, a job-security default might
also avoid existing incentives against information revelation. The current at-will
default may discourage workers from seekingjob security because a request for ajobsecurity contract term could be interpreted as a signal that a worker values security in
order to be able to engage in shirking behavior. See Walter Kamiat, Labor and Lemons:
Efficient Norms in the Internal LaborMarket and the PossibleFailures of Individual Contracting, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1953, 1958 (1996) ("[A]n individual may value [job-security]
protection precisely because she expects (or wishes to reserve an option) to perform
deficiently at thejob in question .... ").
,' This assumption presupposes that if actors are adequately informed, they will
enter into contracts that maximize their utility. If one contract term is more valuable
than another, they will select that term rather than the inferior one, within the constraints imposed by the necessity of obtaining each other's consent. Insufficient
information about the value of the various alternatives is a potential impediment to
utility maximization, but contracting parties do not have to make choices in a vacuum.
They have the benefit of society's accumulated experience as a source of instruction.
An evolutionary process analogous to natural selection has tended to weed out inefficient possibilities.
One commentator describes the law-and-economics notion of legal evolution in
these terms: "The basic thesis is that people share a desire to eliminate unnecessary
costs, and that over time the shared goal of reducing unnecessary costs causes the law
to evolve toward rules of law that are less wasteful or, conversely, rules that increase
economic efficiency." E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionay Tradition inJuisprudenc 85
COLUM. L. REv. 38, 62-63 (1985). Law-and-economics scholars differ in their under-
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This assumption is apparent in Professor Epstein's well-known article
on at-will employment.'4 His starting point is the assertion that
"[t]he survival of the contract at will, and the frequency of its use in
private markets, might well be taken as a sign of its suitability for
employment relations."'6 There is no legal barrier to workers negotiating for job security, so it seems reasonable to infer that employment
at will is as common as it is because both workers and employers
prefer at-will contract terms over job security. In Epstein's words,
"[i]t is simply incredible to postulate that either employers or employees, motivated as they are by self-interest, would enter routinely
into a transaction that leaves them worse off than they were before, or
even worse off than their next best altemative."'6 Having assumed
the efficiency of at-will employment from its prevalence in actual
contracting practice, Epstein then proceeds to offer several reasons
why workers and employers choose employment at will as often as
they do. 16 7 "[T]he task is to explain how and why the at-will contracting arrangement (in sharp contrast to slavery) typically works to the
mutual advantage of the parties. " 10
It is important to see that Epstein's form of argument does not
demonstrate the superiority of at-will employment. Superiority is

standings of the mechanisms that actually drive the selection process. See, e.g., Robert
Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law Without the Help ofJudges?, 9
J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1980) (providing a model for the improvement of the law over
time through an evolutionary process unguided byjudicial insight); George L. Priest,
The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977)
(asserting that the tendency of legal rules to become efficient over time is independent of judicial decisionmaking); Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient,
6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977) (concluding that efficiency in the law occurs because
parties will litigate inefficient rules more often than efficient rules). For a recent study
of theories of biological evolution and their possible relevance to an understanding of
legal change, see J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the
Evolution of Law and Society and Its PracticalMeaningforDemocracy,49 VAND. L. REV. 1407
(1996).
SeeEpstein, supra note 91.
Id. at 948; see also Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. PolsbyJust Causefor Termination
Rules and Economic Efficiency, 38 EMORY L.J. 1097, 1098 (1989) (asserting that the
prevalence of at-will employment indicates its efficiency); J. Hoult Verkerke, An
Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts: Resolving the just Cause
Debate 1995 Wis. L. REv. 837, 874-75 (same).
" Epstein, supra note 91, at 956-57.
167 See id. at 962-77 (discussing the employer's ability to monitor
employee behavior, reputational losses, risk diversification, imperfect information, administrative
costs, bilateral monopoly, and unequal bargaining power as reasons why the at-will
contract usually benefits both sides in employment contexts).
i

Id. at957.
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simply assumed from its survival and frequency in contracting practice. The analysis purports only to explain why people might rationally choose to behave in this manner; it does not claim to establish
that social wealth is actually greater than it would be under a regime
of job security. A particular notion of human rationality and evolutionary process' 69 substitutes for rigorous cost-benefit comparison
grounded in empirical research. 7 ° The only empiricism here is the
observation
that at-will employment is prevalent, at least in this coun1
17

try.

Although systematic empirical investigation of the respective costs
and benefits of at-will versus job-security contract terms has yet to be
undertaken, recently collected empirical data do cast significant
doubt on Epstein's simple faith in the efficiency of the at-will contract
term. Professor Kim's findings strongly suggest that workers employed on an at-will basis typically believe that they possess a significantly greater degree of job security than the law actually accords.1n
This misperception, if it is as pervasive as Kim's data indicate,'73 chal169 See supra note

163.

'70 Commenting on Epstein's article, Professor Rosen, a University of Chicago
economist, expresses appreciation for the analysis, but concern about the lack of
empirical support. Acknowledging that the prevalence of at-will employment contracts suggests that it may be more efficient than alternative mechanisms for enforcing
parties' implicit understandings, he nevertheless writes that "one might rest easier with
some confirming numerical calculations of the costs and benefits." Sherwin Rosen, In
Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 983, 987 (1984). In fact, an emerging
body of empirical research suggests that job security can generate productivity increases. See supra note 89. In light of such findings, the persistence of at-will employment may be due to reasons other than superior efficiency. Part III.B.4 discusses how
this could be the case.
171For an empirical study demonstrating the prevalence of at-will employment, see
Verkerke, supra note 165, at 863-69 (discussing survey results showing that only 15% of
employment contracts include ajob-security term). In this respect, the United States
is unusual. For example, through various legal and nonlegal mechanisms, Japan,
Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom all provide job security for workers. See
Summers, supra note 56, at 1038-57 (discussing the various systems used by these
countries to providejob security).

172 See Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 105, 133-46 (1997)

Kim's study relies on a survey of 337 unemployment insurance claimants. See id. at
129.
173 Kim found that as many as 80% or more of those surveyed believed incorrectly
that Missouri law forbade discharge for various reasons that are in fact lawful. See id. at
134 tbl.1. Important as Kim's data are, Professor Verkerke points out that further
research might involve recently hired rather than recently terminated workers, whose
survey responses might be colored by their experience. SeeJ. Hoult Verkerke, Employ.
ment Contract Law, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW

(forthcoming 1998) (manuscript at 11, on file with author).
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lenges the efficiency assumption. If workers possessed full information about the legal significance of at-will employment, they presumably would value the at-will contract term less highly than they do
and would place a higher value on a job-security term. If so, they
might be more willing than they apparently are now to insist on job
security. Even if they did not value job security that much more
highly, employment contracts presumably would include additional
compensation reflecting the greater risk of discharge to which workers are subject.174 The existence of significant informational deficits
undermines the orthodox presumption of the status quo's efficiency.
If the efficiency of observed behavior cannot be taken for granted,
current arrangments do not deserve default-rule status simply because
people tend to choose them. The next subparts consider why contracting practices may persist despite the possibility of superior alternatives.
2. Path Dependency
Until recently, little attention has been paid to the mechanisms
that determine choice of contract terms. Now, however, the assumption that efficiency determines the status quo may no longer be tenable. Recent law-and-economics research on the theory of path
dependency suggests that historical circumstance, rather than efficiency alone, shapes current contracting practices.' 75 Once a particular contract term has become standard, there may be reasons for its
continued use that are unrelated to its intrinsic value. 75
Professor Roe analogizes choices about legal rules and social institutions or practices to choices about the location of paths leading
choices for reasons
from one point to another. People make such
that are sensible at the time. Thereafter, the chosen path becomes

7

Verkerke's survey of 221 employers in five states found that only 15% expressly

agreed to discharge workers for just cause only. See Verkerke, supra note 165, at 86567. Verkerke concludes that these data present "the best available evidence of
[employers' and employees'] preferences" and therefore justify the current at-will
default as providing the contract term that the parties typically would choose for
themselves. Id. at 897. However, as Kim points out, Verkerke's data do not necessarily
support his normative conclusion, because contracting practices may reflect the
informational deficit that Kim has identified. See Kim, supranote 172, at 122-24.
17 See F. Hodge O'Neal Corporate and Securities Law Symposium:
Path Dependence and
Comparative CorporateGovernance 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 317 (1996); MarkJ. Roe, Chaos and
Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L.REV. 641 (1996).
'76

in

See infra Part III.B.4.
See Roe, supra note 175, at 643-44.

1026

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 146:975

established and then entrenched through ongoing usage. At some
point, the community might be better off abandoning the existing
path and building a new one, because a new path may provide a
cheaper way of getting from point to point. However, there are benefits to retaining the standard route; it must be working reasonably
well or people would not be using it. Further, the costs of building
the new path may be greater than the benefits of doing so.178 It might
even be the case that change is impossible because information about
the superior alternative does not exist.'7 Under such circumstances,
the old path continues to prevail despite the possibility of a better
180
way.
The history of at-will employment in this country reveals that the
practice arose in the context of particular economic conditions that
no longer exist. The standard story describes the at-will presumption
as a nineteenth-century invention."" Professor Feinman attributes the
rule's adoption to treatise writer Horace Wood.182 According to

'78

648-50.

Roe refers to this phenomenon as "semi-strong form path dependence." Id. at

179 Roe

has noted:

If a society cannot think effectively about the alternative path because it lacks
the vocabulary, concepts, or even belief that the other path could exist, then
that society cannot consciously choose either to return to the branch point of
the two paths (and then go down the other path) or to jump to the other
path.
Id. at 651. Roe refers to this situation, in which the existing practice is less efficient
than the alternative, as "strong-form path dependence." Id. at 651-52. In addition to
the strong and semi-strong forms, Roe also identifies a "weak" form of path dependence, by which he means a historical choice between one of two paths that would be
equally efficient. History may explain the origins of the existing practice, but it tells us
nothing about the present relative efficiency of the two alternatives. See id. at 647-48.
180 An example of this phenomenon may be the "QWERTY" order on a typewriter
keyboard. This arrangement, which uses weaker fingers for the more common letters,
originated in the 19th century because typewriter keys jammed easily and the
"QWERTY" order kept typists from working too quickly. The arrangement is no
longer necessary today, but it persists nonetheless. See W. Brian Arthur, Competing
Technologies, IncreasingReturns, and Lock-In by HistoricalEvents, 99 ECON. J. 116 (1989);
Paul A. David, Understandingthe Economics of QWERTY: The Necessity of History, in
EcONOMIC HISTORY AND THE MODERN ECONOMIsT 30 (William N. Parker ed., 1986).
181See, e.g., ROTHSTEIN ETAL., supra note 41, at 10 (noting that "[b]y the end of the
nineteenth century, most American courts began to apply a presumption of terminability at will").
182 See Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 118, 126 (1976); see also HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
MASTERAND SERVANT (2d ed., San Francisco, Bancroft-Whitney Co. 1886).
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Feinman, Wood made it up in 1877 out of whole cloth.'13 Before
1877, American courts supposedly followed English law, which presumed that employment was for a one-year term if the contract was
silent on the question of duration.""
Recent research rejects this account and argues instead that the
American presumption of at-will employment dates back to the colonial period.e Professor Ballam focuses on Maryland, Massachusetts,
New York, and Pennsylvania as case studies. She relies on nonlegal
sources such as newspaper advertisements and other historical information on employment practices, as well as statutory and caselaw
data.'88 Ballam concludes that employment at will was the usual practice among free laborers, both industrial and agricultural, in the four
states she examined 187 and, by implication, more generally in the
antebellum United States as well.
Specific labor market conditions led employers and workers to reject the English presumption of annual hiring in favor of a presumption that better reflected the preferences of both workers and
employers. Extreme labor scarcity meant that competition among
employers accorded workers a range of job opportunities. ' s The
ready availability of land and burgeoning industry in towns encouraged a high degree of worker mobility.8 9 Under these circumstances,
workers valued the freedom to quit at any time, and had the market
leverage to insist on it. Employers, too, preferred flexibility, because
many agricultural and industrial activities were seasonal. In addition,
183

See Feinman, supra note 182, at 126 ("[1]n the absence of valid legal support,

Wood offered no policy grounds for the rule he proclaimed."). Responding to
Feinman, Professors Freed and PoIsby identify some pre-1877 evidence of adoption of
employment at will by American courts, but not much. See Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D.
Polsby, The Doubtful Provenance of "Wood's Rule" Revisited, 22 ARIz. ST. LJ. 551, 554-56
(1990) (discussing four cases, only two of which clearly involve employment at will).

More recently, Professor Morriss traces the endorsement of an at-will rule in various
American jurisdictions. Almost all of the cases he cites were decided after 1870, and,
according to Morriss's research, 22 states did not formally adopt the rule until the
20th century. See Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic
Reassessment of the Rise ofEmploymentAt-Wili 59 MO. L. REv. 679, 699 tbl.I (1994).
'8' See 1 WILLIAM BLACxSTONE, COMMENTARIEs *413 ("If the hiring be general

without any particular time limited, the law construes it to be a hiring for a year....").
28 See Deborah A. Ballam, The TraditionalView on the Originsof the Employment-At-Will
Doctrine: Myth orReality?, 33 AM. Bus. LJ. 1 (1995).

'8 See id. at 5-6.
187

See id. at 47 ("[E]mployment-at-will was always the standard in these four states,

for all classes of laborers...
18

See id. at8.

189

See id.
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recurring depressions necessitated the freedom to lay off workers
during periods of reduced demand. Labor market conditions peculiar to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century America explain the prevalence of employment at will in this country at that time.
As Ballam's study of the caselaw demonstrates, in the absence of
an express contractual term, courts presumed that employment was
on an at-will basis. 190 If employers sought to bind a worker to a specific term of employment, the contract had to specify its duration.
Labor mobility made it difficult to enforce such agreements, but
contracting practice reveals an awareness that an express term was
necessary to avoid the default rule.' 9' Presumably, at-will became the
default rule because it was the term that most parties would prefer if
they had to make a choice between employment at will and job secu92

rity.1

3. Could Job Security Be More Efficient Today?
Historical research indicates that employment at will became
common in the context of particular social and economic circumstances. Path-dependency theory could explain its persistence even if
changes in the economy have rendered it less efficient than job security. Current prevalence, therefore, does not necessarily indicate
efficiency.
Since the nineteenth century, job opportunities have become less
numerous and labor market competition has increased. Under such
conditions, workers presumably would value stable employment more
highly than they would in an environment offering more extensive
employment opportunities. The risk of long-term unemployment,
not faced in the colonial period, may also encourage workers to value
job security.
190 See

id. at 10-14, 21-26, 31-35, 39-42 (discussing treatment of employment dis-

putes by courts in Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, respectively).
19' In contrast, the English presumption of a year's duration seems to have been
based on an oversupply of labor and concerns about the burdens that the unemployed
imposed on the poor relief system. See id.at 48.
192 According to Ballam, court decisions from the later-19th and early-20th centuries, which have been cited as indicating a novel departure from prior law, turn out to
have had a much more narrow import. Rather than adopting an at-will presumption,
which was already part of the law, they adopted the rule that salary stated in terms of a
fixed rate per time period implied an agreement to employ a worker for that length of
time. See id. at 49. Courts also accepted the rule that a worker who had contracted to
work for a specific time period and had stayed on after expiration of that period had
an implied right to renewal of that fixed term. Seeid.
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With the rise of large-scale industrial production, increasing
complexity and task specialization may require workers to make
larger investments in training to be successful on the job. To the
extent such human-capital investments are firm-specific and, therefore, subject to forfeiture if workers lose their jobs, workers again
would tend to place a higher value on job security than in previous
periods.
Changed circumstances may also subject workers to a heightened
risk of employer opportunism. As discussed above, employers stand
to gain if they can fire workers in order to renege on implicit promises of deferred compensation.'93 In the past, reputational considerations may have moderated such behavior in localized labor markets in
which employer behavior was widely known. In contrast, prospective
workers may have less access to information about employers in today's larger-scale, less personal economy.194 To the extent this is so,
at-will employment imposes costs on workers that they may not have
had to bear in the early-nineteenth century.
Employers, too, may stand to benefit from employee job security.
Promises of long-term employment may be necessary to induce workers to make upfront investments in value-creating, firm-specific human capital.' 95 Long-term job security may also encourage worker
loyalty and higher productivity.19 A stable workforce also obviates the
disruption that can occur when training newly hired workers.
As compared with at-will status, job security may increase the likelihood of shirking behavior; under an at-will regime, the employer
need not bear the burden of proving cause in order to fire a worker
who is not living up to her end of the bargain. 97 Even so, it is possible
that the gains generated by job security could outweigh such costs.
Perhaps we now live in a world in which both employers and workers
would be better off under job-security contract terms than under
employment at will. At the very least, vastly changed circumstances
should lead us to question whether at-will employment serves as well
,93See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
194 See Note, supra note 28, at 524 ("The usual job searcher
cannot easily obtain

information about a firm's personnel relations .... In addition, firms may project a
false image ofjob security.").
'95For a discussion of this function of lifetime employment in the Japanese firm,

see Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the JapaneseFirm, 28 J. ECON. LrrERATURE 1 (1990).

"6 See supranote 89.
'97

See Epstein, supra note 91, at 970 (discussing the cost advantages of a contract at
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today as it did at the time of its original adoption in this country
nearly two centuries ago. As Roe cautions, "when we identify current
structures that were path-determined by forces irrelevant to today's
world, we should not accord the current rule or institution a presumption of utility."'9'
4. Why Does At-Will Predominate?
Even if the origins of at-will employment can be traced to economic circumstances that no longer exist, why have workers and
employers not moved from that path to a new one, if the new one
would better serve their interests? Persistent use of the old path
cannot simply be due to the fact that at-will employment is the default
rule. If job security were more efficient, we would expect parties to
employment contracts to adopt that term instead, barring prohibitive
transaction costs.
Drawing on recent research in economics and behavioral psychology, Professors Kahan and Klausner cast significant doubt on the
presumption that the status quo necessarily owes its existence to
superior efficiency.'" Rather, they argue, "one must look closely at
particular contract terms and at their origins before reaching any
conclusions about why a standard term exists."200 They offer several
explanations for the persistence of standard terms, even though a
novel term might yield greater value.
a. Network Benefits

Economists first developed the concept of network benefits or
201
network externalities in the context of product standardization.
Certain products increase in value as their use becomes more widespread. For example, VCRs became more useful as more and more
videocassettes became available, as did personal computers as soft'0 Roe, supra note 175, at 667.
' See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, PathDependence in Corporate Contracting:
Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347 (1996)
[hereinafter Kahan & Klausner, Path Dependence]; see also Marcel Kahan & Michael
Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of
Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997); Klausner, supranote 10.
'0 Kahan & Klausner, PathDependence, supra note 199, at 349.
20' See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, ProductPreannouncements,and Predation,76 AM. ECON. REv. 940 (1986); Michael L.
Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON.
REV. 424 (1985).
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ware products proliferated. Increased videocassette and software
production, however, depended on increasing ownership of VCRs
and personal computers constructed in a standard format. Standardization created value that otherwise would not have existed. 2 "
Klausner's innovative insight was to apply the network externality
idea to standardization of contract terms. 2

3

A widely used contract

term may result in greater value for its users than the term would
yield if it were used only occasionally. 204 It is possible that these benefits may be sufficient to justify resorting to the standard term even
though an alternative might otherwise be more efficient.
One benefit of standardization is the accumulation over time of a
body of judicial interpretation, resulting in a more concrete, determinate meaning than a nonstandard term would enjoy. The availability of a standard term with a more or less definite meaning also
creates a bias in its favor because the costs of adopting the standard
term are significantly lower than choosing an alternative. Parties who
desire the typical contract provision can simply adopt the standard
term. In the employment context this is particularly easy, because
contractual silence incorporates the at-will default rule. In contrast,
parties seeking to include ajob-security term would confront the costs
of drafting appropriately specific language. This can be a timeconsuming process, especially because there is uncertainty as to how
courts will interpret novel language.
Contracts reflecting settled practice and being offered on a takeit-or-leave-it basis also have the advantage of avoiding the costs of ad
hoc bargaining. 2 0 In the employment context, such costs can be
especially significant because uncertainty about the costs and benefits
of a novel job-security contract term compounds already difficult
valuation problems. Employment contracts differ from sales contracts
in an important respect: Rather than purchasing a good, the em26
ployer hires an agent whose value depends on her future effort. 1
Likewise, the value of an employment opportunity to a worker depends in part on the employer's future behavior toward the worker.
SeeKahan & Klausner, PathDependence,supra note 199, at 351.

20 See Klausner, supra note 10, at 774 ("Although corporate contract terms do not
entail technological connectivity as computers, telephones and other network products do, analagous benefits of standardization exist.").
2
See Kahan & Klausner, Path Dependence, supra note 199, at 350-53 (discussing
increasing returns from the standardization of contract terms).
205 See Reder, supra note
46, at 247.
20 See Herbert A. Simon, A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship, 19
ECONOMETiucA 293, 294-95 (1951).
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Determining these future values is difficult for both parties because
each party's assessment of value depends in large part on a prediction
about the other party's future behavior. Behavior varies among both
workers and employers according to various idiosyncratic personality
traits. Some people work harder than others, and some employers
207
Market conditions, such as comare more trustworthy than others.
petitive pressures or opportunities that give employers or workers
more or less freedom to behave opportunistically, may also affect
future behavior.
In a competitive labor market in which at-will is the standard
term, the going wage for a particular job embodies a collective judgment grounded in experience about the costs and benefits of that
contract term. Among other considerations, the wage incorporates
assessments by both workers and employers of aggregate data on the
likelihood that the other party to the contract will behave opportunistically. Departures from the going wage are likely to occur only in
exceptional cases, in which reliable information about a particular
worker's or employer's trustworthiness is available. In contrast, if one
or both of the parties want to substitute ajob-security term, each must
make a judgment about its likely costs and benefits in order to recalculate the wage. Rather than relying on the market's determination,
the parties now must make predictions both about each other's and
their own future behavior, and about future market conditions. This
is difficult enough, but, as noted already, there is the added difficulty
of predicting how a court will interpret the novel contract term in
various possible future contexts. The very commonness of the at-will
term involves potential contracting gains that are not available to
parties seeking to contract on ajob-security basis.
In short, the benefits that accrue to standardization may be sufficient to outweigh the benefits that both workers and employers could
realize by shifting to a job-security regime. Even if an at-will contract
term-shorn of any network benefits-were less valuable to the parties than job security would be, shifting to ajob-security regime would
entail loss of these benefits. Such losses may be large enough to keep
people on the well-worn at-will path.

See supra note 162 (noting that it may be difficult for employers to distinguish
between high-effort and low-effort employees at the time of hiring).
207
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b. Herd Behavior
Economists have developed the "herd behavior" theory to explain
a tendency of decisionmakers to mimic the behavior of others, even
when it might seem that rational reliance on private information
should yield a different choice. 20" According to one herd behavior
model, the reputational costs that come with decisions that turn out
badly are lower if the actor was simply following standard practice
than they would be if she was acting innovatively. 211 If, for example,
investment managers make investment decisions that prove to be
losers, their superiors are less likely to deem them foolish if they were
following the decisions of others rather than acting in a contrarian
Professors Sharfstein and Stein posit that this is because
manner.
smart managers are assumed to behave alike; what makes them
"smart" is their shared ability to identify truthful information about
the wisdom of particular investment choices. Contrarians, therefore,
are more likely to be perceived as foolish precisely because they have
failed to follow the herd.2 '
Kahan and Klausner apply the herd behavior idea to contracting
to suggest a similar tendency among agents to prefer standard terms
212
Their discussion focuses
when contracting on behalf of principals.
on the incentives against innovation that lawyers face when drafting
contracts for clients. The key idea is the potential conflict of interest
generated by the lawyer's reputational concerns, which may lead the
lawyer to imitate the actions of other lawyers even when faced with
information that ought to counsel a novel course of action.1 3

208

See David S. Scharfstein &Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 AM.

ECON. REv. 465 (1990) (discussing how group psychology may affect investment
decisions by fund managers); Jeffrey Zweibel, Corporate Conservatism and Relative
Compensation, 103J. POL ECON. 1 (1995) (same).
209 See Scharfstein & Stein, supra note 208.

"0 See id.at 466 (noting that "an unprofitable decision is not as bad for reputation
when others make the same mistake").
211

See id Scharfstein and Stein refer to this phenomenon as a "sharing-the-blame"

effect. Id.
212

SeeKahan & Klausner, PathDependence supra note 199, at 353-58.

Kahan and Klausner's discussion of herd behavior among attorneys, see id. at
355-58, draws on Scharfstein and Stein's analysis, see supranotes 208-11 and accompanying text. Kahan and Klausner also discuss other reasons why reputational concerns
may lead lawyers to favor standard contracting practice over innovation. Lawyers,
23

vulnerable to reputational costs if a contract does not accomplish the client's objec-

tives, may be less willing than clients would be to assume the risk of uncertainty of
outcome that a novel contract term presents. See Kahan & Klausner, Path Dependence,

supra note 199, at 354 ("To the extent that a lawyer cannot diversify career risk, lawyers
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The herd behavior idea may be pertinent to a broad range of contracting situations.1 4 In the employment sphere, nonunion workers
generally act on their own behalf. Firms, however, must act through
agents, who are concerned not only with their employers' interests,
but also with their own reputations. Thus, even if the agent believes
that the expected value of using ajob-security contract term is greater
than that of contracting on an at-will basis, the higher costs associated
with failure may be sufficient to encourage resort to the standard
term instead. Ajob-security term, therefore, would come at a higher
price than would be the case if at-will were not the standard term.
Herd behavior makes use of the at-will term more likely than would
be the case if job security were the standard term, and is another
reason why persistent resort to the at-will contract term may not be a
function of its superior efficiency.
c. Cognitive Biases

Behavioral psychology research also may help to explain why a
standard contract term could be less efficient than an alternative.
Kahan and Klausner focus particularly on status quo bias and the
215
endowment effect, anchoring bias, and conformity bias.
As discussed above, investigators have found that people faced
with choices about how to spend resources tend to favor existing
216
In contractual settings,
patterns of expenditure over alternatives.
Kahan and Klausner conjecture that people tend to view the standard
217
Thus, the fact that employment
contract term as the status quo.
contracts are typically on an at-will basis may create a bias among
workers and employers alike in favor of at-will employment. When, as
in this context, the standard contract term is also the default rule, it
seems plausible that the bias in its favor may be even stronger. The
fact that the contract need say nothing in order to elect the standard
will frequently be more risk averse than their clients."). Kahan and Klausner also
suggest that, even if lawyers are not more risk averse than clients, failure may weigh
more heavily than success on a lawyer's reputation, causing lawyers to favor standard
contract terms that have a lower range of possible outcomes than nonstandard terms.
See id. at 354-55 ("[A] contract term that fails ... may weigh more heavily in a lawyer's
reputational payoff than a contract term that succeeds.").
214 See Kahan & Klausner, PathDependence,supra note 199, at 356 (pointing out that
reputational costs of innovation could arise in many contracting situations).
215 See id. at 359-64.
"' See supra Part II.B.1.
217 See Kahan & Klausner, Path Dependence, supra note 199, at 361-62; see also
Korobkin, Status Quo Bias, supra note 97, at 630-33.
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term may reinforce the sense that this is the usual way things are
done. Status quo bias, if applicable to choices between standard and
nonstandard contract terms, could provide a further reason why the
pervasiveness of at-will employment encourages people to favor it over
job security."'
Like status quo bias, the endowment effect leads people to prefer
existing states of affairs over alternatives, even though they would
prefer the alternative if endowed with it instead. As discussed above,
the endowment effect appears to apply to contractual default rules as
well as ownership of assets, even though default rules confer no rights
in the absence of an agreement with another party.2 9 Because at-will
is the default rule, employers enjoy the presumptive right to discharge members of their workforce. If the endowment effect is operative, employers may value that right more highly than they would if
job security were the default and it were necessary to bargain and pay
for the rights implicit in the at-will default rule.
Similarly, workers may value the wage premium that comes with
at-will status more highly than they would ifjob security and a lower
wage were the starting point for negotiations. In other words, the
existence of the endowment effect in some settings allows us to hypothesize that workers and employers alike value the bundle of rights
associated with employment at will more highly than they would ifjob
security were the default rule and standard practice instead. Again,
the status quo, simply by virtue of its existence, may generate a presumption in its favor that supplements any value it would otherwise
enjoy.
Anchoring bias refers to the effect of initial reference points on
judgments about value.20 In one study, real estate agents and lay
2"' See generally Korobkin, Status Quo Bias, supra note 97 (discussing status quo bias

in relation to default rules).
219 See supra Part II.B.2. As Kahan and Klausner put it, contracting parties "have no
formal property (or other) rights in a standard term." Kahan & Klausner, PathDependence, supranote 199, at 361.
220

See Gregory B. Northcroft & Margaret A. Neale, Experts, Amateurs, and Real

Estate: An Anchoring-and-Adjustment Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions, 39 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PRocEssEs 84, 85 (1987) (noting that psychological litera-

ture on anchoring "suggests that (a) an arbitrarily chosen reference point (anchor)
will significantly influence value estimates, and (b) value estimates will be insufficiently

adjusted away from the reference point toward the true value of the object of estimation"); see also S. PIous, Thinking the Unthinkable: The Effects of Anchoring on Likelihood
SOC. PSYCHOL 67, 70-71 (1989) (finding that
estimates of likelihood of nuclear war depended on magnitude of initial reference

Estimates of Nuclear War, 19 J. APPLIED
point).
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people were asked to assess the value of a house2 1 They were given
listing prices that ranged from $119,900 to $149,900; both the students and the real estate agents inspected the house before being
asked to assess its value. Those real estate agents who were told that
the listing price was $119,900 assessed the house's value at an average
price of approximately $114,000, while those who believed the listing
price to be $149,900 valued it at approximately $129,000.2 Similarly,
the students valued the house at an average price of approximately
$117,000 when provided with the low listing price and at approximately $144,000 in response to the high one.2 2
Kahan and Klausner suggest that standard contract terms may
have a similar anchoring effect because they carry with them "an aura
of stability and objectivity."224 The fact that the at-will doctrine is not
only the standard term but also the default rule may strengthen this
effect. If so, the at-will default, acting as an anchor, may cause workers and employers to gravitate toward it more readily than they would
if it did not provide a reference point for contract negotiations. They
may value it more highly because it is the standard term than they
would if it were not.
d. Myopia

In addition to the phenomena discussed by Kahan and Klausner,
there may be yet another psychological predisposition or bias in favor
of at-will employment. Professor Elster suggests that myopia may be
at work when people are unwilling to choose courses of action with
short-term costs despite superior long-term benefits.2
A worker or an employer contemplating switching from the at-will
default to a job-security regime would incur predictable short-term
costs. From the worker's perspective, there would be search costs in
identifying those employers willing to depart from the standard at-will
2'
20

SeeNorthcroft & Neale, supra note 220, at 92.
See id. at93.

See id.
Kahan & Klausner, PathDependence supranote 199, at 363.
See Jon Elster, Seif-Realisation in Work and Politics: The Marxist Conception of the
Good Life, 3 SoC. PHIL. & POL'Y 97 (1986), reprinted in ALTERNATIVES TO CAPITALISM
127, 138 (Jon Elster & Karl Ove Moene eds., 1989) ("The fact that seif-realisation
involves deferred gratification... must enter importantly into the explanation of why
it is not chosen even when its superiority is clearly recognised."); see also Cass R.
Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1164-66
(1986) (discussing "[tihe phenomenon of myopia-refusal to engage in an activity
with high long-term benefits because of its short-term costs").
22
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contract term to bargain to a job-security outcome. Employers considering hiring workers on a job-security basis would have to undertake more elaborate screening efforts to reduce the costs imposed by
restraint on their freedom of discharge, and workers would incur
signaling costs as they attempted to demonstrate ex ante their reliability.22 Workers and employers also would have to draft an appropriately complete and specific contract term, a task made more difficult
by the absence of standard language that has acquired determinate
meaning through recurrent judicial interpretation. This cost is likely
to appear especially weighty when compared with the elegant simplicity of the at-will doctrine, which has "the convenient virtue of meaning just what it says, no more and no less."27 In the absence of a
market price, efforts to price a novel contract term are also likely to
require time-consuming bargaining.
The myopia phenomenon could lead workers and employers confronted with such costs to reject the job-security alternative even if it
promised greater long-term benefits. According to Elster, it is the
temporal sequence of cost before benefit that seems to breed
"weakness of the will" under certain circumstances.22 Well-known
examples include unwillingness to take the difficult steps necessary to
quit smoking cigarettes despite the known long-term health benefits,
or refusal to wear uncomfortable safety belts while driving despite the
promise of significant protection in the event of an accident. Even
when there can be no doubt about the net benefits of making a
change, people sometimes seem unwilling to make the required
efforts. Similar behavior could be at work in the employment contract setting as well.
I suspect there may be more to myopia than simply the sequence
of cost and benefit. It may be that known short-term costs interfere
with the ability to make accurate valuations of long-term benefits.
Especially where the long-term gains are genuinely difficult to measure, the existence of more definite short-term costs may create cognitive "static." For example, a smoker who knows that quitting will be
very unpleasant might be unable to comprehend fully the less concrete benefits that it will eventually bring. Similarly, workers and
employers, aware of the difficulties of contracting around the at-will
default, may be incapable of fully grasping the benefits ofjob security.
226

See supra note 162 (discussing signaling as a response to employer inability to

discriminate between high- and low-effort employees).
=7 Epstein, supra note 91,
at 955.
22 Elster, supra note 225, at 138.
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Inability to appreciate the value of innovation may be even more
likely when the existing practice enjoys a long history and has worked
at least tolerably well. This analysis suggests a cognitive dimension to
myopia as well as a behavioral one.
e. Sour Grapes

The phenomena indicating a preference for the status quo over
possible alternatives may also reflect a general tendency to value what
we have more highly than we would if we did not have it and, correspondingly, to value less highly what we do not have. This is the "sour
grapes" idea described by Elster.2 Orthodox economic analysis takes
peoples' preferences as given or exogenous to social contexts.23°
Elster responds that preferences may be shaped by peoples' perceptions of what is reasonably available to them.231 In this sense, preferences may be endogenous. Like the fox in the fable who suddenly
developed an aversion to grapes that it realized it could not reach,
people who perceive that certain alternatives are beyond their grasp
may prefer more readily available choices for that reason alone. In
other words, preferences are derived from the circumstances in which
people find themselves.
According to Elster, the sour grapes phenomenon reduces cognitive dissonance by reducing frustration that would otherwise arise
from the boundedness of the set of feasible choices. s However, it
may be that people's preferences adapt not only to perceptions of
what is and is not available, but also to what they possess. Thus, people's preferences may be shaped by a tendency to value what they
have, and a corresponding tendency to devalue what they do not
have. Even if alternatives are available, the advantages and disadvantages of existing patterns of behavior are likely to be familiar and
reasonably well understood. Change, in contrast, involves investigation and evaluation of alternatives that threaten uncertain conseSeeJON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES 109-40 (1983).
m See, e.g., GeorgeJ. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67

AM. ECON. REv. 76, 76 (1977).
2' See ELSTER, supra note 229, at 121-22; see alsoJon Elster, From Here to There: Or,If
Cooperative Ownership Is So Desirable, Why Are There So Few Cooperatives?, 6 SOC. PHIL &
POL'Y 93, 96 (1989) (suggesting that prevalence of capitalist over cooperative business
ownership may be due in part to endogenous preference formation). For a discussion
of the implications of adaptive preferences for legal policy, see Sunstein, supra note
225, at 1145-50, 1169-74.
212 See E.STER, supra note 229, at 109.
222 See id. at 110.
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quences. People appreciate existing behaviors and social systems, in
part, because they function as reference points, while alternatives
look worse simply by virtue of their status as such.2
The tendency of preferences to adapt to the status quo could explain a general preference for at-will employment, even if people
would prefer job security if at-will employment were not the norm.
Unlike the grapes in the fable, a job-security contract term is not
literally beyond the reach of those who might want it. Nevertheless,
the fact that employment at -ill is the standard practice may itself
suggest that a job-security contract term is not a realistic alternative,
and its status as the default rule may imply the same message. In a
similar vein, Elster suggests that adaptive preferences may explain a
general reluctance among workers to form or to join cooperatively
owned firms, even though there is no legal impediment to doing so.2
Perhaps more importantly, there are genuine costs involved in negotiating for a job-security term, making it less attractive than at-will
employment for that reason alone. Furthermore, inexperience with
the benefits ofjob security and uncertainty about the magnitude of its
cost (in the form of reduced wages) may also encourage higher valuation of the familiar at-will contract term.
In this Part, I have argued that a path-dependency understanding
of employment at will as a practice and as a default rule suggests that
its current prevalence does not necessarily indicate superior efficiency. Employment at Vill may have made sound economic sense at
the time of its adoption in this country.23 6 It became the dominant
practice. Nevertheless, there are plausible reasons why at-will employment might continue to predominate even if it is no longer
superior to job security. Some of these reasons involve genuine-that
is, objectively identifiable-economic benefits. A history of settled
practice confers value on a contract term by virtue of its widespread
acceptance. Other reasons for at-will's predominance may have a
more purely subjective or psychological dimension. There may be
2m

The similarities between Elster's "sour grapes" idea and the endowment effect

and status quo bias should be apparent.
" See Elster, supranote 231, at 109-10 ("It is a truism, but an important one, that

workers' preferences are to a large extent shaped by their economic environment.
Specifically, there is a tendency to adaptive preference formation, by which the actual
mode of economic organization comes to be perceived as superior to all others.").
'6Even that choice was path-dependent. People do not make abstract cost-benefit
choices about their practices or institutions. Such choices are always embedded in a
particular historically conditioned context.
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behavioral or cognitive barriers that tend to bolster the status quo.
And, even if job security would now better suit both workers and
employers, the costs involved in discovering and evaluating those
potential gains may be prohibitive, preventing full appreciation of
alternatives despite their feasibility.
I am not arguing here for the superior efficiency of employment
a
on job-security basis. Rather, my point is that at-will's predominance should not be taken as a measure of its superiority. The question of the efficiency of the status quo appears to be far more
complex and uncertain than previously has been appreciated, and it
should no longer be taken as an article of faith. It may be that the
status quo can lay claim to a presumption of efficiency, though the
question of where the burden of proof should lie requires research
yet to be undertaken. If the relative efficiency of at-will employment
is uncertain, the current prevalence of at-will should not by itself
provide a sufficient reason to retain its default-rule status. As discussed above, there are potential distributive gains to be realized by
changing the default rule to job security237 At-will employment's
presumed superior efficiency is too uncertain to warrant hesitation
for that reason alone.
CONCLUSION

Corporate law's commitment to shareholder wealth maximization
can be costly for nonshareholders. Communitarians have rejected
the mainstream contractarian view that self-protection through contract is the appropriate response. The reasons for this rejection have
not always been articulated clearly, but I believe the core concern
should be the fact that wealth constraints inevitably limit the ability of
many nonshareholders to bargain and pay for adequate safeguards.
Because I have doubts about the adequacy of existing law reform
proposals in a communitarian vein, I have presented a new law reform approach in this Article. Recent economic research strongly
suggests that nonshareholders-workers have been the focus herecould benefit from a change in the existing contractual default rule
from employment at will to job security. The ambition is not necessarily to usher in a new era of lifetime employment in this country.
Rather, the aim is to improve bargaining outcomes by making it
possible for workers to capture a larger share of the gains from trade,

2

See supra Part II.
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regardless of whether actual contracts end up including at-will or jobsecurity provisions. For a number of reasons, at-will employment's
pervasiveness is an inadequate indication of its superior efficiency and
therefore does notjustify retaining the at-will default rule.
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